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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study aims at analyzing Japan’s domestic politics and international political factors 
which influenced the policymaking process. The study examines the interaction between 
elected politicians and career bureaucrats by using the domestic policy-making models 
suggested by Aberbach et al. With a view to analyzing which of international/domestic 
political factors influenced the decision-making, this research makes a framework using 
Second Image Theory by Waltz and Second Image Reversed Theory by Gourevitch.  
 
For empirical analysis, this research conducted three case studies: Shin Kanemaru’s visit 
to Pyongyang in 1990 and, Junichiro Koizumi’s visits to Pyongyang in 2002 and 2004. In 
each case, domestic and international factors that influenced their visits were examined.  
 
Based on given criteria (actors, interests, interaction, and outcomes), the research 
identified the policymaking model that best fits each case and determined whether 
domestic or international political factors influenced on their decision making. The 
results show that the abduction issue is not domestic political interest oriented, but 
influenced by international political factors. Due to the U.S. alliance as a factor, Japan’s 
North Korean policy including the abduction issue has some limits to pursue its own 
direction. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Research Background 
 
The relationship between Japan and North Korea is complicated. The broad spectrum of 
problems across bilateral and multilateral issues make the security environment in 
Northeast Asia more complicated. Past affairs and the abduction of Japanese nationals are 
bilateral issues. The North Korean nuclear development, missile launch and the collective 
security issues are multilateral problems. Due to the geographical proximity, Japan faces 
North Korea's nuclear threat directly. Along with the military threats, the abduction of 
Japanese citizens remains a humanitarian issue. 
 
In the 1970s and the 1980s, Japanese citizens mysteriously disappeared over the 
archipelago. Investigations by the government of Japan and testimonies of an escaped 
former North Korean secret agent proved that those missing Japanese people were have 
thought to be abducted by North Korea. Kim Hyun Hui, the North Korean terrorist who 
bombed a Korean Airlines flight from Baghdad to Seoul, killing 115 people, claimed that 
she had been trained in Japanese language and Japanese customs by an abductee, Yaeko 
Taguchi. After 1991, the Japanese government has raised the abduction issue whenever it 
has opportunities. So far, the Japanese government estimates there are total of 17 abduction 
victims.  Despite Tokyo's continuous complaints, Pyongyang had denied it firmly. 
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However in 2002, when Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Pyongyang for a Summit 
Meeting with Kim Jong Il, Kim admitted the fact of abduction committed by North Korea. 
After that, the abduction issue of Japanese nationals had made steady progress in the 
negotiations. 5 abductees returned to Japan in October 2002 and their family 
members  came to Japan in 2004.  However, after that, there has been no more visible 
progress on the abduction issue as Japan keeps demanding the complete solution of the 
issue whereas North Korea repeatedly says that the issue is already closed.  
  
The abduction issue lied at the center of Japanese politics from 1997 when the Mori 
delegation group raised the issue for the first time to 2004 when the family members of 
abductees came to Japan. The issue encompasses security, foreign policy, diplomacy, and 
national politics. As Katsuei Hirasawa (2004), a senior Diet member pointed out in his 
book, Japan's abduction policy and strategy shows how incapable Japan is as a sovereign 
state (p. 17). In fact, the abduction issue had not been a central political issue in Japan 
during the 1980s. The issue was mentioned only once during the former Deputy Prime 
Minister Shin Kanemaru's visit to Pyongyang in 1990. Over the next 2 years, it has been 
mentioned 8 times during bilateral negotiations. Finally in 1997 when the Association of 
the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea (AFVKN) and the National Association 
for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (NARKN) were organized, the 
abduction issue became a significant political issue in Japan. The bipartisan group of Diet 
members, named Assembly Members Alliance for the Speedy Rescue of Japanese 
Kidnapped by North Korea (Rachi Giren, 拉致議連) was established in 1998. The 
Japanese government established "Headquarters for the Abduction Issue" in 2013 
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consisting of all ministers in order to discuss possible measures to solve the issue and make 
a strategy. Prime Minister leads the Headquarters and the Chief Cabinet Secretary (CCS) 
and Foreign Minister serve as the deputies. Every individual minister closely works 
together in order to resolve the abduction issue. Also, politicians bipartisanly collaborate 
for the resolution of the abduction issue at the "Liaison Council of Government and Ruling 
and Opposition Parties Institutions for Measure against Abduction Issue".  
 
The politicization of the abduction issue has influenced Japan’s foreign policy towards 
North Korea. As different groups with different interests try to lead the abduction policy, it 
is important to analyze Japan’s North Korea policy based on the domestic politics. In most 
modern states, elected party politicians and professional state bureaucrats play a major role 
in terms of policymaking (Aberbach, Putnam& Rockman, 1981, p.3). Especially in Japan, 
bureaucrats used to be a strong policymaking group based on their expertise, but after the 
Oil Crisis in the 1970s, the elected politicians with better knowledge and expertise of 
certain policy have had power of command in policymaking (Keddle, 1993, p. 19).   
 
These politicians having expertise and representing certain interests, so-called “Zokugiin1”, 
is a unique characteristic of Japanese domestic politics. The clash or collaboration between 
Zokugiins and career administrators from Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in the 
abduction policymaking has shaped Japan's abduction policy towards North Korea based on 
domestic political situations. LDP Diet members are able to accumulate knowledge and 
experience in specific policy fields by attending subcommitee meetings and gained the 																																																								1 Zokugiin is a Japanese word, which is a combination of Zoku(族) meaning tribe and Giin(議員) meaning elected 
representatives. 
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Zoku title with their increased influence vis-a-vis bureaucrats in the same policy area 
(Shinoda, 2013, p. 40). While Zoku politicians become specialized within certain policy 
areas, the Prime Minister takes the lead in overall policymaking.   
 
This research aims to analyze how Japan's foreign policy towards North Korea vis-à-vis the 
abduction issue is linked to Japanese domestic politics. In this paper, the author would like 
to address how the Japanese domestic political system influences Japan's foreign policy, 
especially the abduction policy. If it is true that the abduction issue is a dominant issue in 
Japan's North Korean policy, then why it became a crucial issue should be answered as 
well. On the other hand, if the abduction issue is not a critical issue in Japan's North Korean 
policy, then the reason must be explored as well. In order to answer the main research 
question, this thesis ask which “Image of Policymaking” suggested by Aberbach, Putnam 
and Rockman best explain the interaction between Japanese politicians and bureaucrats 
regarding the abduction issue related policymaking. Also, whether domestic or 
international political factors have influenced on the decision making process will be 
examined. 
 
 
1.2. Literature Review 
 
As a foundation of foreign policy decision making, understanding who leads the political 
parties, where major political decisions are made, and who influences such political 
decisions is essential to discuss domestic politics. Bureaucrats, the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP), and industries, the so-called “iron triangle” consist Elite Model, which is 
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suggested by Fukui (Y.C. Kim, 2000, p.3). Crespo (1995) mentioned that the strong links 
between bureaucrats and parliamentary faction of the ruling party of the LDP makes career 
administrators consult with elected politicians in regards to the formulation of public 
policy. Large corporations influence the LDP’s political continuity with their finances and 
the votes from the direct spending of enormous resources for the electoral clienteles. 
Policies led by the LDP also have great influence over industries, and it is the reason why 
the ruling party and big businesses need constant consultants with each other while 
interacting with bureaucrats (p. 201-202).  
 
Yoichi Funabashi (2008) points out that it is more important to strengthen diplomatic 
system and get public support in order to build a solid strategy for diplomatic normalization 
with Pyongyang (p.104). Kim Young Choon’s 2000 article discusses how the change in 
Japanese domestic politics influences its North Korean policy at its analytic center. His 
analysis deals with pluralistic approach to the policymaking process in Japan by not only 
the LDP and MOFA, but also by media, industry, and the Prime Minister. He gives 
plausible explanations for the policymaking that major political decisions vis-à-vis the 
fence mending between Tokyo and Pyongyang has been made by the Prime Minister. 
However, Kim’s study mainly touches upon each actor’s role in the general policy of 
diplomatic normalization with North Korea and lacks an explanation on how these actors 
interact with each other. 
 
International Crisis Group’s attempted to explain why the abduction issue was placed at the 
center of Japan’s North Korean policy in spite of other security issues such as missile and 
nuclear development. The study is predicated on the notion that the Japanese public seems 
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to understand that nuclear missiles threaten national security, but the mass media, pressure 
groups, and some politicians want to use the abduction issue politically, putting it at the 
front line of the public consciousness. The politicization of the abduction issue has become 
a major interest of the Japanese public among issues relating North Korea. Due to this, the 
Japanese government cannot promote diplomatic normalization with North Korea. 
Regardless whether the two parties can reach the resolution of the abduction issue, it seems 
that achieving diplomatic normalization is difficult unless Tokyo’s policymakers can 
satisfy the Japanese public. The article evaluates that the domestic solidarity with North 
Korea is too dangerous politically. However, it motivates the discussion in the paper but 
could be explained more clearly with detailed example of the political decision making vis-
à-vis North Korean policy. 
 
Those literatures above deal with the abduction issue as a part of Japan's North Korean 
policy. In other words, their analyses generally describe the abduction issue as a factor of 
hindrance of Tokyo-Pyongyang relations. However, the abduction issue has much more 
both international and domestic political aspects than previous works have suggested. This 
thesis intends to investigated long-neglected the decision-making process vis-à-vis the 
abduction. 			
1.3. Analytical Framework 
 
In this section, the narrative explanation on how bureaucrats and politicians engage in the 
policymaking process will be reviewed along with the Second Image and the Second Image 
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Reversed theory, which explains how the domestic politics and the international politics are 
related. While the “Images of Policymaking” frameworks defines roles of politicians and 
bureaucrats in policymaking, the Second Image and the Second Image Reversed theory 
give the explanation how the domestic politics influence foreign policy making or vice 
versa. By analyzing these two different frameworks, it would be possible to find a linkage 
as how to they are related. 
 
1.3.1. Second Image and Second Image Reversed 
 
Diplomacy is distinguished from International Relations, which emphasizes "interactive" 
aspects among states, as it highlights the "one-directional" aspects of each state's external 
behaviors. “Realism paradigm frameworks” in International Relations focusing on the 
international level of politics had prevailed while domestic level factors had been 
neglected. Frameworks focusing on domestic factors only appeared after the 1950s. 
Considering the temporal background at that time, when the fear of nuclear war and 
expansion of Communism was prevalent in society, “Realism” theory arguing the 
importance of national security should have been recognized per its exactness. However, 
after the mid 1950s, many scholars studying domestic input factors had various inputs 
levels to consider as well. Snyder postulates a personal level of decision-making that must 
be taken into account. He recognizes decision makers as factors that influence foreign 
policy, but operate separately and independently from domestic and international factors. 
As his theory is limited to a personal level, it is difficult to be considered a domestic factor. 
Other than Synder, there are many theoretical frameworks explaining the relationship 
between domestic politics and international politics. However, in this research, the author 
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tries to build the argument that connects domestic politics and international politics using 
the Second Image theory by Kenneth N Waltz and the Second Image Reversed by Peter 
Gourevitch. These studies explain the direction between domestic and international politics, 
which influences a state’s behavior. In addition, this theoretical framework assumes that the 
central authorities representing governments bear both international and domestic pressures 
when they make decisions on foreign policies. 
 
Most theories emphasizing the domestic political factors in diplomacy research explain a 
state’s behavior in the international politics with domestic makeup of a state. Kenneth N. 
Waltz (1959) says that the international political results, which are the outcomes of foreign 
policies of a state, depend on the domestic political factors. Kenneth N Waltz analyzed 
reasons of international conflicts suggesting three images; the first image is based on 
human nature and behavior, the second image deals with the internal structure of states, and 
the third image concerns the anarchical nature of international politics. He sees that the 
internal structure of states, in other words, the domestic politics in a state are a decisive 
factor in the state’s behavior, which is reflected in its foreign policy. 
 
However, the Second Image Reversed theory by Peter Gourevitch (1987) states that the 
domestic political factors are not causes of the international political outcomes, but rather 
the international political factors change the domestic political situations. In short, the 
Second Image Reversed theory understands that the domestic structure is influenced by 
outer factors, not a given one. Regarding the second image, Gourevtich suggests the 
Second Image Reversed theory. He points out that "the international system is not only a 
consequence of domestic politics and structures but a cause of them" (Gourevitch, 1978, p. 
	 	 9	
911). In other words, the international political factors lead to domestic political 
circumstances. The Second Image Reversed theory does not see the internal structure as a 
given factor, but it is influenced by external factors. 
 
Diplomatic issues are not limited within the frame of diplomacy, but they are interrelated 
with domestic politics in the reality. In other words, both international and domestic levels 
of politics are mutually interactive (Putnam, 1988, p. 436). Whereas the earlier two theories 
discuss one directional influence, the Two-Level theory suggested by Robert Putnam 
(1988) explains how the Level I and the Level II negotiations are connected2. Negotiations 
between states lay on Level I and negotiations surrounding legislation between insiders lay 
on Level II. Putnam used the notion of "Win-set" in his work, which is the agreeable point 
about the Level I negotiation inside of domestic politics. In order to conclude the 
negotiation, there should be an overlapped area where the negotiators' Win-sets meet. The 
size of win-set will be decreased when there are too many interests and different opinions 
within the Level II win-set. Thus, larger win-sets make international agreements more 
likely as win-sets of each state are overlapped. However, this framework does not work 
when there is no win-set making factors in the domestic politics. The problem of applying 
this framework in this research is that the abduction issue does not really have win-set in 
the Japanese domestic politics, so it seems difficult to apply this framework in this 
research. 
 
																																																								
2 Putnam suggests the concept of “win-set”, which is a possible outcome possibly accepted by domestic level and 
international level (Putnman, 1988, p. 437). He addresses three factors deciding the size of win-set, which are the 
following: 1) the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level II constituents, 2) the Level II 
political institution, and 3) the strategies of the Level I negotiators.	
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To sum it up, it is possible to create a framework that analyzes the relationship between 
domestic politics and foreign policy making. Firstly, foreign policy is not a direct product 
of domestic politics, but it is a reflection of overall circumstances both in the domestic 
politics and international politics during a certain period. Secondly, as Gourevitch argues, 
foreign policy can also be a result of the struggle among domestic actors in order to 
respond to external pressures. Thus, this research shall propose the importance of the 
interaction among actors during times of power struggle. Thirdly, in order to define the key 
variables substantially influencing the foreign policy decision-making process, it is 
significant to determine who the ultimate decision making unit is and the controlling 
variables, which domestic political environment during certain period when such foreign 
policy decisions are made. 
 
1.3.2. Image of Policymaking 
 
Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman suggested four "Images" of the possible divisions of labor 
between politicians and bureaucrats. Image I to IV illustrate how the politicians and 
bureaucrats interact with each other throughout policy-making process. In principle, both 
elected politicians and career bureaucrats commit their full efforts to realize and maximize 
public interests.  
 
In domestic politics, both elected representatives (politicians) and non-elected bureaucrats 
are involved in policymaking and implementation. Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (1981) 
proposed four “Images” of the possible division of labor in the policymaking or decision-
making process between politicians and bureaucrats. Aberbach et al. illustrated the 
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interactions between politicians and bureaucrats in Image I to IV throughout the 
policymaking process. 
 
1.3.2.1. Image I 
 
Image I represents the simplest view of politicians and bureaucrats; politicians make 
policies and bureaucrats implement those policies. Image I, which is the earliest model of 
policymaking, suggests the most simplistic view of the division of labor between politicians 
and bureaucrats. Politicians make political decisions and bureaucrats implement those 
policies. According to Weber, Image I is the ideal relationship between politicians and 
administrators, but this distinction is ultimately untenable because every policy issue has its 
political significance and is influenced by political considerations (Aberbach et al., 1981, 
p.5). Sometimes politicians lack information, expertise, and even time compared to career 
bureaucrats. This Image sees that the bureaucratic politics has the supremacy over party 
politics.  
 
1.3.2.2. Image II 
 
Image II, so-called the Weberian model, assumes that both of them participate in 
policymaking process. However, their roles are different: politicians bring representing 
interests of their constituencies and bureaucrats bring neutral expertise. Image II, also 
known as the Weberian Model, suggests that both politicians and bureaucrats are involved 
in policymaking processes with distinct roles. Whereas politicians who represent interests 
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of their constituencies include them in the policymaking process, bureaucrats take their 
neutral expertise into consideration. In other words, elected parliamentary law makers are 
more active in response to relevant constituencies, and career bureaucrats highlight the 
technical efficacy of policy. This model finds the contrasting characteristics between 
“political rationality” and “administrative rationality”. According to the Image II, 
politicians are to be articulators, mediators, and balancers of diverse claims and interest 
among members of society. They also resolve conflicts among differing opinions as they 
represent multiple competing public interests and address various demands from society. 
Government officials are coordinators of interests in accordance with fixed standards and 
judgment. Not by any partisan logic, but by set of administrative rules, they deal with the 
holistic interests of society.  
 
1.3.2.3. Image III 
 
According to Image III, both of them engage in the policy making process, and both are 
concerned with politics. The real difference between them is the scope or range of interests. 
Whereas politicians articulate broad, diffuse interests of unorganized individuals, 
bureaucrats mediate narrow, focused interests of organized clienteles. 
Image III explains that both politicians and bureaucrats engage in the policymaking process 
with regard to politics. “Politics” refers to the legislation. What makes their roles different 
is what their interests are and how deep and wide those interests span. In other words, the 
range and scope of interests differentiate in nature during policymaking. Politicians are 
burdened by the broad and diffused interests of numerous unorganized and incoherent 
individuals. On the other hand, bureaucrats have fewer and more focused interests of 
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organized clientele to consider. The characteristics of politicians can be defined as 
passionate, partisan, idealistic, and even ideological. In contrast, bureaucrats are prudent, 
centrist, practical, and pragmatic. Both of them review the political and administrative sides 
of policies. This is why senior civil servants are closely related to genuinely focused upon 
political interests. However, unorganized interests give incentives to politicians as their role 
is articulating interests relating to their constituencies. Bureaucrats are responsible for 
mediating among interests within a single sector, whereas politicians have responsibility for 
aggregating cross-sectorial interests. This type of policymaking model has only emerged in 
last few decades, which means as countries become administrative states, this model 
provides a better explanation on modern governance style (Lehman, 1984, p. 1148). 
 
1.3.2.4. Image IV 
 
Image IV, the pure hybrid model, blurs the distinction between the roles of politicians and 
bureaucrats by a politicization of the bureaucracy and a bureaucratization of politics. Image 
IV highlights the blurred distinction between the roles of politicians and bureaucrats. It is 
called as the pure hybrid model. The Weberian distinction of the role between elected 
politicians and career bureaucrats, Image II, is blurred. Most top bureaucrats who belong to 
the gray zone of politicians’ and bureaucrats’ roles can fit into this mold. Especially in 
Japan, the high rate of personnel circulation between the political and administrative fields 
results in a vague distinction between the characteristics of politicians and bureaucrats 
(Aberbach et al., 1981, p. 17). For example, cabinet officers, White House staff, and the 
chancellery can be classified as political administrators. 
	 	 14	
1.4. Methodology 
 
This study intends to make a practical analysis of how Japanese domestic politics and 
international politics influenced its North Korean policy on the abduction of Japanese 
nationals. In order to explain the internal policymaking process in Japanese domestic 
politics, the study will examine different policy-making models suggested by Aberbach et 
al. to find the best explanation of Japan’s foreign policy towards the abduction issue and 
the interaction between politicians and bureaucrats. Second Image Theory of Waltz and 
Second Image Reversed Theory by Gourevitch structure the analytic framework of this 
research. In other words, the thesis will explore international factors and domestic factors, 
which had influence on policy-making regarding the abduction issue. Reflecting on key 
assumptions of analytical frameworks, the thesis will investigate the characteristics of the 
abduction policy-making in Japanese politics and foreign policy. 
 
In order to achieve the primary objective of the study, this thesis will be limited to the 
temporal range. The journey of Shin Kanemaru, the former Vice Prime Minister and a 
prominent figure of the LDP is the starting point of this study as it was the first Japan’s 
approach to DPRK in order to discuss diplomatic normalization. The study will focus on 
the Koizumi and the Abe Cabinet because like Kanemaru, these two politicians are from 
LDP, where Zokugiin belongs. Two other major Zokugiins, Katsuei Hirasawa and Kyouko 
Nakayama, and their activities will be studied in order to find out how the resolution of the 
abduction issue can be a political incentive for politicians. 
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In relations to the geographical range, the study only considers Japan and North Korea, as 
this research mainly focuses on the domestic politics of Japan and its influence on the 
formation of its abduction policy. Although the Japanese government has attempted to link 
the abduction issue to nuclear development and missile launch issues with other countries 
in the region, especially at the Six-Party Talks, this study will deal with only the bilateral 
relationship with Japan and North Korea and Japanese domestic politics. 
 
In order to answer the research questions, it is required to collect and analyze raw texts 
from documents analysis, empirical observation and interviewing (Johnson and Reynolds, 
2005). Document analysis was conducted, as it is a significant information source. 
Government publications and agreements between governments in relation to the abduction 
issue were analyzed. Both Japanese and English academic journals are used for theoretical 
analysis. Empirical observation were made using Internet sources, such as Internet 
government and media websites such as Kikuzo II Visual (Asahi Shimbun database) and 
Yomidasu Rekishikan (Yomiuri Shimbun database), since this Internet media provides a 
broad scope of secondary data. In order to identify relevant archives on search engines, 
specific keywords such as “North Korea”, “Abduction Issue”, and “Koizumi”, “Kanemaru” 
were used via the databases of Japanese newspaper media. Furthermore, other English and 
Korean media such as The New York Times, The Japan Times, and Jungang Ilbo were 
largely considered because they provide details of Japan’s foreign policy and domestic 
politics towards the abduction issue. Two interviews were conducted in order to confirm 
several factors, which are indicated neither in the mass media nor in academic sources. One 
interviewee (Tomiichi Murayama) agreed on citing his name directly, but on the other hand, 
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the other interviewee requested to cite anonymously considering his or her current public 
service career. 
 
 
1.5. Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 1 has discussed the research background including a brief explanation of the 
politicization of the abduction issue in the Japanese domestic politics, and the interactions 
of policy-making process between politicians and bureaucrats with the theoretical 
frameworks. 
 
The major objective of Chapter 2 is to analyze the relation between Japan’s domestic 
politics and foreign policy making process. By analyzing actors in policymaking such as 
Prime Minister, the LDP, the MOFA, interests groups, and mass media, this study tries to 
find out how they are related to each other and the roles of them in the foreign policy 
making in Japan generally and to provide the basis of analysis on the interaction between 
the LDP and the MOFA in the abduction policy making in the following chapters. 
 
Chapter 3 will provide case studies how political decisions have been made, and by whom. 
Three cases, Kanemaru’s visit to Pyongyang in 1991, Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in 
2002 and Koizumi’s visit in 2004, are examined and show: 1) how the international 
surroundings and Japanese domestic politics influence Japan’s North Korean diplomacy, 
and 2) how Japanese bureaucrats and elected politicians interact with each other in making 
progresses related to the abduction issue. 
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Chapter 4 will discuss the findings and analysis based on previous chapters. The chapter is 
an examination of the theoretical framework of Chapter 2. Thus, the main work of this 
chapter is to discuss the theoretical implication of research findings of how both 
international and domestic factors influence Japan’s foreign policy towards the abduction 
issue and which Image of interaction between bureaucrats and politicians fits into each 
case. More specifically, the key research findings will be combined with the discussion 
about the Abe Cabinet’s abduction strategy so far. Finally, the identification of limitation of 
this thesis will be addressed for further possible research. 
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Chapter 2. Japan’s Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
After Kim Jong Il had admitted the fact that North Korean special agents abducted 
Japanese citizens in Japanese territory, the incident became one of the major security issues 
in Japanese politics. It became and still is the most sensitive foreign policy issue in Japan 
since its occurrence, not only for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) but also for 
elected politicians throughout both the House of Councilors and the House of 
Representatives. The Mass media and special interest groups, such as the Kazokukai and 
the Sukuukai substantially influenced on the formation of public opinion among Japanese 
citizens. They eventually spearheaded a movement to make politicians and MOFA actively 
engage into reacting to the abduction of Japanese people. For politicians who are elected by 
the people, including the Prime Minister, their handling of this matter can directly affect on 
the votes they receive at elections, as well as their popularity. For MOFA, strategizing vis-
à-vis the abduction issue is also vital in terms of diplomacy with North Korea. As an ally of 
the United States, the abduction policy can influence the alliance. As the United States 
plays a major role in Japan’s security, Japan’s foreign policy towards North Korea must be, 
in large part, aligned with that of the United States. Japan’s foreign policy towards North 
Korea is based upon its domestic politics. However, as Robert Putnam pointed out, there 
are two levels of politics, both national and international, that determine how a nation’s 
foreign policy will develop (Putnam, 1988, p.434). 
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In this chapter, the author intends to review scholarly debates about how Japanese domestic 
politics influences its foreign policy, in order to prepare an analytic framework for Japan’s 
foreign policy making towards North Korea regarding the abduction issue of Japanese 
people. It aims to identify the key players and their inter-relations in policymaking. 
 
 
2.2. Elitist or Pluralism in Japanese Foreign Policy Making 
 
When it comes to analyzing foreign policy based on domestic politics, it is important to 
define who has the leadership and who has influences on policymaking. Traditionally, the 
Japanese model of foreign policy making puts emphasis on the Elitist model, which is 
consisted of the bureaucracy, politicians and industries. The Elitist model anticipates that 
the bureaucracy is stronger than politicians. However, the Pluralist approach includes more 
actors in policymaking such as factions in the LDP, bureaucracy agencies in the 
government, interests groups and media (Y.C. Kim, 2001, p. 1). As the four Images of 
policymaking introduced earlier indicate the interactions between bureaucrats and 
politicians on the policymaking process, it is possible to see whether the nature of policy-
making is Elitist or Pluralist approach. 
 
Margaret Herman suggests that variables related to domestic affairs that affect the foreign 
policy making process ought to be taken into account based upon who the ultimate decision 
making unit is. She illustrates three units; a predominant leader3 with the ability to stifle all 
																																																								
3 If a top leader of country is a predominant leader who is able to exert his absolute influence on foreign policy making, 
his or her sensitiveness to international affairs should be examined. The control variable is the contextual sensitivity of the 
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opposition and dissent as well as the power to make a decision alone (if necessary), a single 
group4 being responsible for dealing with the occasion for decision under consideration, 
and a coalition composed of multiple autonomous actors5, for example, individual leaders, 
groups of policymakers, bureaucratic agencies, and interest groups (Herman, 2001 P.56-
62). 
 
Japanese bureaucratic supremacy developed after World War II. During the United States’ 
occupation period, the U.S Military Government strengthened the bureaucracy in Japan, 
making it the most powerful actor in policymaking. Due to the support of the U.S. Military 
Government, the bureaucracy remained the most influential decision making body until 
1955, whereas political could not function as main legislative bodies due to frequent 
overrunning and dismissing. 
 
However, the 1955 system created Japan’s unique political governance style: the Iron 
Triangle. The bipolarity of Japanese domestic politics was formed when the LDP emerged 
as the ruling party after the consolidation of the Democratic and Liberal Party, with the JSP 
being the biggest opposition. During this time, many bureaucrats joined the LDP and as a 
consequence had significant influence in the political arena, which had significant impact 
on policymaking and subsequently led to bureaucratic dominance. However, after the Oil 
Crisis in 1973, this bureaucracy dominant tendency in the policymaking process began to 
																																																																																																																																																																									
leader. If he or she is insensitive to the international politics, it is important to explore his or her own personality. If he or 
she is sensitive, examining circumstantial pressure is essential along with his or her personality (Herman, Herman, and 
Hagan, 1987, p. 313-314). 
4 If a certain single group is the most important variable in foreign policy making, the control variable is concurrence, 
which is the pattern of achieving consensus (Herman et al, 1987, p. 315). 
5 When multiple autonomous groups are involved in the process, it is necessary to examine the relationship among those 
groups.	
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change. In other words, the governmental fiscal austerity would not allow bureaucrats to 
raise enough capital for governmental projects. Bureaucrats with sectionalist tendencies 
were not able to react to such a rapid transformation of surroundings. Eventually, an active 
political ‘decision’ was required in order to overwhelm the national crisis and as such 
resulted in the LDP’s enhanced and strengthened political influence. 
 
This circumstance allowed certain politicians to be involved in the policymaking process 
more deeply. They sometimes have more expertise than bureaucrats in certain 
administrative fields and better connections with related governmental bodies, other 
bureaucrats, related industries and interest groups (the Iron Triangle). These LDP 
politicians formed groups called tribes or Zoku (族), in Japanese, which represent the 
interests of certain industries, wielded strong influence on policymaking and decision in 
specific fields. In other words, the tribe politicians (Zokugiin, 族議員) have expert-level of 
knowledge and know-how in specific policymaking fields (Inoguchi and Iwai, 1987, p.76). 
They possess cumulative expertise in particular government policy areas and network with 
ministries and bureaucrats. When the policies contradict the interests of the lobbying 
groups that Zokugiin represent, they try to exercise their influence over the policymaking 
process to better serve the interests of their constituencies (Rakhmanko, 2015, p. 18). 
There are two opposing paradigms in the political science literature on Japanese domestic 
politics. One is the Power Elite Model, which refers to the triple alliance of the Japanese 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), bureaucrats such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
in the case of foreign policy, and big business participating in policymaking. The other is 
the pluralist approach, which suggests that there are more participants in Japanese 
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policymaking process from a wide range of areas. Especially inside of the LDP, some 
influential politicians having ties with businesses lead policymaking have relatively deeper 
knowledge of certain policy fields than bureaucrats do and with this expertise, they 
represent interests inside Zoku and create the interest-intensive mechanism (Inoguchi and 
Iwai, 1987, p.15). Zoku, the policy tribes refer to group of politicians with “a considerable 
amount of influence in a particular area of government policy and enough seniority in the 
party to have influence on a continuing basis within the ministry responsible for that policy 
area” (Curtis, 1988, p. 114). 
 
The Policy Affairs Research Council of Liberal Democratic Party (政務調査会, PARC) 
converts each Zokugiin’s interests and advocacies into LDP’s own interests and advocacies 
(Inoguchi et al., 1987, p.99). The fact that the PARC became an important policymaking 
and decision-making institution is closely related to Japan’s law evaluation system. As 
Japan adopts a parliamentary cabinet system, those bills approved by the LDP, the ruling 
party, can then be submitted to the parliament for approval. According to the LDP 
Constitution, Chapter V, Article 42, Clause 2, “bills and plans shall be deliberated by the 
Policy Research Council before they are officially adopted as Party Policy” (LDP 
Constitution). The passage concerning bills at the PARC is the most important process in 
the entire policymaking process. Thus, Zokugiins who are in charge of evaluating and 
deciding policies in the Policy Division of PARC can exercise their influence throughout 
the policymaking process. 
 
Inoguchi et al. separate such Zokugiins in 4 types. The first type is the “Master” type of 
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Zokugiin. Putting a narrow definition on Zokugiin, this type of Zokugiins fits best to the 
definition. The Masters are veteran lawmakers with personnel networks both in the party as 
well as factions (Inoguchi et al., 1987, p.155). They are influential not only at the general 
level of policy decision, but also at the comprehensive field of policy decision. They 
mediate interests inside their own policy tribes and direct policy orientation. With the 
authority over personnel decisions, they have strong leverage against bureaucrats and the 
LDP. Sometimes their expertise surpasses other LDP members and professional 
bureaucrats in terms of the quantity of information and knowledge, and theoretical aspects 
of policy. In summation, their interest-intensive role is leading tribes’ policy directions and 
representing whole tribes’ political interests. 
 
The second type is termed the “Soldier”. In contrast to the Masters, the Soldiers refer to the 
wider range of Zokugiins. They are classified as Zokugiins other than the Masters, but they 
are yet to be recognized as Zokugiins fully due to their weak leverage against the 
bureaucrats and the LDP. Nonetheless, they are recognized as Zokugiins, their influence is 
unfairly distributed and relatively limited. These Soldiers are seen to be reserve force of the 
tribes and ought to be evaluated by the Masters, bureaucrats, related interest groups, and 
their constituencies (Inoguchi et al., 1987, p.158). They stand at the very front line of Zoku 
phenomena while inducing interests of the policy tribes where they belong. 
 
The third type is the “Mob”. The Mobs have a weak foundation of support compared to 
other types of Zokugiins. Various LDP members gather and form the majority of the party. 
They aim at accomplishing interests with loud voices. In contrast to Masters and Soldiers 
who pursue interests from certain policy fields, Mobs tend to form ad hoc groups. 
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The last type is the “Generals”. Their decisive role concretely frames whole policy 
directions of the LDP. Current Prime Minister, former Prime Minister, and leaders of 
factions can be referred as Generals. As their decisions restrict each policy decision in a 
comprehensive way, they make highly strategic decisions for the long term. Different from 
Masters, Soldiers, and Mobs, Generals are required to consider overall national interests as 
well as the LDP’s interests and widen their viewpoints due to the increased necessity for 
globalization of policies (Inoguchi et al., 1987, p.163). 
 
What motivates Zokugiins is not only the support from constituents, but also the political 
funds from related industries. Amyx et al. pointed out that the Zoku-system is an 
institutionalization of policy-based financing for the LDP’s political machinery and a 
mechanism satisfying the party’s particularistic electoral strategies (Amyx, Takenaka, and 
Toyoda, 2005, p. 28). However, there are fewer factors attracting the LDP politicians to be 
Zokugiins in the foreign policy field. This is because there are few politicians who used to 
serve at the MOFA, and few interests relating foreign affairs. Among 242 members of 
House of Councilors, 116 members belong to the LDP (House of Councillors, the National 
Diet of Japan). Again, among 475 members of House of Representatives, 291 of them are 
affiliated to the LDP as of May 2016 (House of Representatives). Among the total of 407 
LDP members throughout both Houses, only three politicians used to serve as bureaucrats 
at MOFA (Senkyomae)6. 
 
Also, politicians think that foreign affairs are of little concern with regard to elections and 
voters’ concerns. The Committee on Foreign Affair and Defense in the Parliament has 21 																																																								6		Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi, Rintaro Ogata, and Minoru Kiuchi from House of Councillors.	
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members as of May 10, 2016 (House of Councillors, The National Diet of Japan). Among 
21 members, 9 of them belong to the LDP. Yukihisa Fujita used to serve as the chairman of 
the Special Committee on North Korea Abduction Issue and Related Matters in 2009. 
Yaichi Nakahara (the current chairman of the Committee) and Hirofumi Nakasome belong 
to the Special Committee. 
 
 
2.3. Major Actors of Foreign Policymaking in the Abduction Issue 
 
2.3.1. Prime Minister 
 
There are two characteristics of Japan’s foreign policy decision-making process. One is the 
Japan Inc. theory, the so-called the Elite Model in which Japan’s system is well organized 
and managed by elite bureaucrats. The other perspective is that of the reactive state theory. 
The reactive state as interpreted is that outside pressures are influential in regard to policy 
change in a state (Calder, 1988, p. 518).  Especially in the case of Japan, the Peace 
Constitution restricts Japan from being involved in any international conflicts directly, and 
makes Japan dependent on the United States regarding its military and security affairs. As 
Japan relies upon the U.S.-Japan Alliance, it is removed from decision-making concerning 
international conflicts or even war. 
 
In his writing, Kim Young Choon brought to light Haruhiro Fukui’s patterns of Japanese 
foreign policy. There are two types of Japan’s foreign policymaking patterns; one is daily 
type and the other is emergency type (more precisely, the ‘emergency’ does not mean time-
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mattered issue but highly politicized controversial issues). The emergency type is 
somewhat between the daily type and crisis type, which refers the foreign policy decision-
making pattern in acrimonious dispute and highly tensioned situations vis-à-vis certain 
diplomatic issues (Kim, 2001, p. 9). The emergency type of foreign policy decision-making 
pattern shows such nature. First, a wide range of groups such as party politicians, 
bureaucrats, mass media, and related interests groups are concerning the issues. Second, the 
number of people who are involved in the decision making process directly is few, and the 
prime minister is at the center of decision-making. Third, the advisory group is limited to a 
small number of powerful politicians from the ruling party, the CCS and the foreign 
minister (Kim, 2001, p.10). However, when an issue becomes politically sensitive or highly 
politicized, the role of foreign minister is less significant and the prime minister’s will or 
the involvement of ruling party is relatively increased. Thus, the settlement or resolution of 
the issue likely depends on a politically calculated decision rather than the rational 
decision-making process. Especially, when the prime minister needs to exercise his 
political leadership through resolving the issue, this tendency is remarkably visible. 
 
According to Inoguchi et al. ‘s classification of Zokugiin, the prime minister belongs to the 
“General” group. His political decisions aim at embracing a broad range of interests overall 
for the long term. The more politically sensitive an issue is, the more important the prime 
minister’s decision becomes. He considers not only the issue at hand, but also issue-related 
matters in a wider scope. His policy plan is based upon long-term state governance, 
pondering his supporter group and overall influence on both domestic and international 
politics. 
 
	 	 27	
In Japanese domestic politics, conventionally, Japanese Premiership is seen to be weak and 
passive due to the frequent shuffle of prime ministers. From the Elitist point of view, the 
Prime Minister is not a crucial autonomous actor. His power is too weak to make consensus 
from the constraints of the bureaucracy, the LDP and big corporates. Hayao evaluates the 
Prime Minister’s role is limited as a mediator of last resort from the Pluralist perspective 
and an engager when lower bodies face deadlock of policy decision (Hayao, 1993, p. 3-12). 
However, considering his role as the head of both the Cabinet the Administration, his role 
is so to say not too weak to influence overall policy decisions. His role is a pure hybrid of 
both politicians and bureaucrats. Engaging in decisional deadlock situations and leading 
policies in a solid direction is what the “General” type of Zokugiin does. Since the Japanese 
Prime Minister is also one of members of the House of Representative. As of May 2016, 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is a member of the House of Representative and his 
constituency is Yamaguchi 4th District (House of Representative). The Prime Minister 
concerns not only interests of his own constituency, but also general national interests. He 
himself might not able to bring a strong neutral expertise, but his Cabinet consisted of 
bureaucrats who have the technical efficacy of policy. Based upon his partisan, idealistic 
and ideological initiative, he can initiative policies with the support from bureaucrats’ 
prudent, centrist, practical and pragmatic knowledge. 
 
2.3.2. Liberal Democratic Party 
 
The LDP, the most dominate and powerful political party in post- war Japan’s 
parliamentary has been a crucial actor in foreign policymaking, owing to its political 
control over the executive and legislature during its time in power (Lai, 2013, p. 84). The 
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LDP’s PARC (especially Foreign Affairs Division, for the foreign policy decision-making) 
plays a pivotal role in legislating diplomatic policies. In the case of weighty diplomatic 
issues, obtaining approvals from the Secretary General of LDP, the Chairman of the 
General Council, and the Chairman of the Policy Research Council Board is a de facto 
custom of the LDP, so that those three actors’ role has an impact in the foreign policy 
making process. The President is the highest authority of the LDP, normally is in charge of 
managing the government as the Prime Minister. The Secretary General, as the second 
executive of the LDP, is dealing with the practical management of the party, policy 
decision-making, electoral finance, and election strategies. The Chairman of the General 
Council is the de facto actor, who makes final decision of the PARC	 (Hashimoto, 1999, 
p.75-78).  After the Oil Crisis, in accordance with increasing involvement of Zokugiins in 
policy making, the role of the PARC has become more critical. However, in the foreign 
policy area, the Zokugiins’ activity is not as prevalent and the number of Zokugiin in the 
foreign policy area is relatively smaller than other fields. Due to lack of information 
compared to MOFA and their limited ability to gather, analyze, and assess information 
make the LDP politicians less motivated to join the foreign affair tribe (Gaimuzoku). Thus, 
politicians rely on bureaucrats for most of their information (Hayao, 1993, p. 9). Only when 
the nature of certain diplomatic issues is highly politicized, the LDP utilizes its political 
power assertively to downscale the MOFA’s monopoly of influence on foreign policy 
making. 
 
However, Zokugiins do exist in the international theater. There are a group of politicians 
who are deeply involved in foreign affairs, and the term Gaikozoku is used in reference to 
them (Hagström, 2005, p.72). One example is Suzuki’s involvement in the return of 
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Northern Territory. Muneo Suzuki, a former member of the House of Councillors, was 
deeply engaged in Japan-USSR (Russia) negotiations on the return of four islands with his 
ally in MOFA, Masaru Sato, a former senior analyst in MOFA’s Intelligence and Analysis 
Bureau and a veteran Russian specialist. They promoted flexible policies, including 
modified gradualism (段階返還論), accepting the return of two islands as USSR suggested 
(Yoichiro Sato, 2008, p. 85). Suzuki had accumulated strong influence within MOFA and 
his proactive approach towards Russia was significant enough to affect on the negotiation 
process. Both Suzuki and Sato ended up being prosecuted for a political scandal. MOFA 
did not welcome the involvement of a politician (Suzuki) and non-career diplomat (Sato) 
meddling in their affairs. With the corruption scandal and the negative image of ‘Makiko 
Tanaka’s enemy, Suzuki’, Suzuki’s political life faced serious consequences (Masaru Sato, 
2005, p. 64). 
 
2.3.3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
Japanese bureaucrats are known to be tremendously influential and empowered compared 
to other states’ bureaucrats (Cooney, 2015, p. 81). MOFA is the competent authority 
dealing with diplomatic and foreign affairs. Its distinctive role is the monopoly of 
information regarding foreign issues. MOFA monopolizes the official and vital information 
channel, which helps the Prime Minister or foreign minister recognized crucial 
international circumstances, judge situations, and be aware of the nature of the issues at 
hand. Also, MOFA functions to recommend alternative policies in order to adjust its 
decisions for reacting to diplomatic issues. 
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Based on its strengthened information gathering system and the analysis structure, 
particularly the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, MOFA utilizes 
“a close network centered on its diplomatic missions to gather information from a broad 
range of areas and engage in a comprehensive analysis of international situations” in order 
to support the Prime Minister and foreign minister in making decisions. The strength of 
MOFA is that it has specialized knowledge and ability to mitigate between differing 
opinions. Politicians and the Prime Minister rely upon MOFA for its expertise, experience 
in foreign affairs, specialized personnel and networks. 
 
Meanwhile, another interesting fact of MOFA is that since Japan is a resource poor country; 
other ministries, agencies, and private industries with an interest in the foreign policy-
making expect MOFA to play an integral role in the formulation of foreign policy (Dobson, 
2003, p. 15). It allows other ministries other than MOFA to engage in the foreign policy 
decision-making process. Japan’s post war diplomacy focusing on economic relations with 
other states is strongly influenced by other ministries. MOFA, with less domestic interest 
base is more externally cooperative than internally, but other ministries such as Ministry of 
Finance (MOF), Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), and Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), who have to protect interests of domestic interest 
groups, sometimes take non-cooperative attitudes towards the foreign affairs. The weak 
domestic interest base provides such an environment where other ministries and even 
politicians can influence the foreign policy making process. This is why Japan’s diplomacy 
is criticized as a two-track diplomacy as each ministry represents its own interest without a 
holistic governmental level of consent towards certain diplomatic issues. 
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Furthermore, the LDP’s influential politicians tend to be appointed as the ministers of 
MOFA. During the post war period, except for two ministers, Saburo Okita and Yoriko 
Kawaguchi, every minister of MOFA has been from the LDP (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Japan). They are prone to represent the ruling party’s interest rather than MOFA’s own 
policy goal or a holistic national interest based on professional knowledge. 
 
MOFA’s long-range policy goal is said to be “the safety and betterment of life for the 
Japanese people” (Cooney, 2015, p. 95). Also, as it is an institution dealing with foreign 
affairs, it aims at increasing bilateral and multilateral harmony with other states (Sudo, 
2014, p. 24). Japanese political agents including MOFA assist the institutionalization of 
ideas through organizational routines. They have developed routines based on Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOP), which provides the base of daily decision-making. Bureau 
offices and divisions follow the SOP.  Kimie Hara uses Allison’s definition of the SOP, 
which is similar to the norm in a way as it means standards of appropriate behavior. 
Policies made on the basis of the existing SOP lean toward falling into incrementalism as a 
decision making pattern (Hara, 2008, p.82). 
 
In contrast to the daily type, in an emergency type of decision-making, MOFA’s direct 
control over the situation tends to be lower and top leaders such as the Prime Minister and 
foreign minister possess the majority of the decision making power. Here, an “emergency” 
does not mean a time-constrained issue, but rather a politicized or controversial issue. In 
the case of the recent negotiations to settle the dispute over wartime comfort women at the 
end of 2015, the main negotiator was both states’ foreign minister. South Korean President 
Park Geun Hye and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe were eager to foster an agreement 
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within 2015, the 50th anniversary of normalization of diplomatic relations between two 
countries and the 70th anniversary of the end of the World War II (The New York Times, 
December 28 2015). Despite tremendous domestic negative reactions from both countries, 
the agreement reached conclusion. However, MOFA’s stance for the wartime comfort 
women issue is that there was no compulsive haul of Korean women (Sankei, February 17 
2016) and the payment of compensation was completed based on the Treaty on Basic 
Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea signed in 1965 (Asia Economy, 2016). 
As the comfort women issue is a highly politicized matter, Prime Minister and foreign 
minister’s political decision had more influence over the issue than MOFA’s policy 
direction. 
 
2.3.4. Mass Media 
 
The fundamental function of mass media is agenda setting in general (Green-Pedersen and 
Stubager, 2010, p. 664; McCombs and Shaw, 1972, p. 177). Politicians draw the public’s 
attention in order to frame public debate by exposing themselves to mass media (Green-
Pedersen et al, 2010, p. 665). In particular, mass media in Japan has great power over both 
society and politics. It contributes the political pluralism with primary influence not only 
over the decision making elites, but also in a broader sense, over society as a whole (Ikubo, 
1986, p. 329-330). Mass media provides the platform for the public to voice up their 
opinion towards governments’ policies and serves as a watchdog of states overall (Eijad, 
2012. P. 76). 
 
However, mass media will influence party politics only when it best suits their interest. 
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Many politicians rely on media exposure and attempt to get public attention (Green-
Pedersen and Stubager, 2010, p. 664 -666). An Increasingly controversial situation is 
politicians’ role and media can be an influential tool to stimulate the public’s sensitivity 
(Scalapino, 1977, p. 5). 
 
Also, mass media can be an effective communication channel used by opposing parties. As 
the LDP has become a big ruling party regardless of several power transitions from the 
LDP to other parties, sometimes the mass media serves the role of representing opposing 
parties’ stance towards both the ruling party and MOFA’s foreign policy directions or 
strategies by articulating public opinions (Inoguchi, 1988, p. 354). 
 
As stated above, Japanese mass media is the place for not only key policy makers, but also 
for the general public in order to express their policy preferences. The way mass media 
conveys to the public about the international political environment can focus public opinion 
on certain issues, and this attention can influence foreign policy making based on what the 
people deem important at the time. 
 
2.3.5. Interest Groups 
 
In postwar Japanese politics, interest groups have arisen as key actors in the policy-making 
process by their active participation in politics based upon their economic and occupational 
power (Hellmann, 1969, p. 21). The most powerful interest groups are business and 
agricultural organizations. They build connections with bureaucrats and party politicians in 
order to direct governmental policies in accordance with their interests. 
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Kenneth G Hunter borrows several different definitions on interest groups from different 
scholars. When it comes to analyzing the relationship between interest groups and foreign 
policy decision-making process differ vastly from one another. These two definitions can 
explain the nature of interest groups in better way than definitions in Hunter’s article. 
Schlozman and Tierney (1986) define an interest group as an “organization that seeks join 
ends through political action”. They focus on interest groups’ characteristics looking for a 
‘joint’ with politics. The other definition suggested by Salisbury (1975) is that an organized 
association, which engages in activity relative to governmental decisions (Hunter, 1999, p. 
66).  Salisbury takes note of the nature of interest groups with regard to ‘engagement’. The 
characteristics of ‘joint’ and ‘engagement’ are important in order to explain interest groups’ 
influence over foreign policy making due to its complexity. Unlike domestic public policies, 
which have domestic groups as referent objects, foreign policies, on the other hand, are 
directed at international collective actors such as foreign governments (Beach, 2012, p. 6). 
 
According to the survey conducted by Tsujinaka and Pekkanen (2007), Japanese interest 
groups represent various social and economic sectors. Those 11 types of interest groups 
addressed 22 policy areas as their areas of interest. Most organizations showed their interest 
in civic activities such as welfare, environment, education/sports, international and 
consumers. Meanwhile, a relatively small number of them addressed their policy interest in 
security, foreign policy, human rights, and public safety (Tsujinaka and Pekkanen, 2007, 
p.427). 
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2.4. Conclusion 
 
The discussion in this paper has set up a theoretical framework in order to define whether 
the foreign decision-making process is Elitist or Pluralist model. Especially, in foreign 
policy making process, policy makers have to consider given both domestic and 
international factors. Based on investigating domestic international factors, it is possible to 
analyze how bureaucrats and politicians interact regarding decision making, and which 
factors influenced more on decision making. 
 
The Prime Minister, politicians, and MOFA are the official authorities of foreign policy 
making. From the perspective of Elitist, these actors dominate the foreign policy making 
process with their authority as elected representatives (both politicians and the Prime 
Minister) and as an administrative body (MOFA). However, the appearance of Zokugiin 
has brought more plural involvement in the policy making process. Based on the social 
network, the career bureaucrat level of expertise in certain policy areas, and legitimacy 
from supporters (as these Zokugiins are elected by citizens), bring domestic factors into 
foreign policy making. 
 
The Prime Minister plays a significant role when issues relating to foreign policy escalate 
politically. As both the head of administration and an elected representative, his foreign 
policy goal should to be satisfying long-term national interests and his supporters. The LDP 
politicians, especially Gaimuzoku from the LDP, lead foreign policy making process 
through PARC (in particular, Foreign Affair Division). Whereas MOFA has its own policy 
goals as it cares more about external factors then domestic factors, its interaction with 
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politicians and Prime Minister is important. The mass media and interest groups do not 
have the authority to participate in the policy making process, but they have influence over 
the decision making process by shaping public opinion and representing certain types of 
interests. 
 
Based on the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians, they both engage in policy 
making. Politicians (Zokugiin) care about domestic factors more and bureaucrats (MOFA) 
consider international factors more due to their organizational characteristics. According to 
Image II suggested by Aberbach et al., politicians represent the interests of their 
constituencies and bureaucrats bring neutral expertise. In the foreign policy making process, 
however, politicians having interests regarding foreign policy (Gaikozoku) might not only 
be concerned with their constituencies’ interests, but also represent broader interests of 
multiple policy areas. However, as MOFA brings its knowledge and expertise, most of time, 
MOFA becomes a negotiating party with foreign negotiators. However, when an issue 
relating other states escalates controversially and politically, the Prime Minister’s 
involvement plays as a decisive role and he becomes the directly contracting party. 
 
In Image III, politics is defined as a process of articulating interests and causes, and 
governing the process of authoritatively resolving public problems through policies. Master 
type of Zokugiins focus on specific policy areas and represent interests within these areas. 
They promote specialized and localized interests rather than broader social interests on 
behalf of the society as a whole. Bureaucrats in Image III are still limited within their 
bureaucratic boundaries; however, their political engagement is still not ignorable and the 
logic of bureaucratic politics has a considerable influence on the policymaking process. 
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Image IV shows the coincidence of political interests and bureaucratic rationality. 
Aberbach et al. see that career path of individual politicians who used to be high-rank 
bureaucrats and bureaucrats working at key central agencies such as the cabinet office, the 
chancellery, and the White House result in Image IV type of policymaking. However, 
besides the individual factor, such mutual understanding is possible when the two parties 
share common goals and visions towards certain issues. In Japan, bureaucrats are imbued 
with a sense of mission and the willingness to strengthen their power in order to achieve the 
mission. So that, they tend to link to the ruling parties closely, but the individual 
bureaucrats are rarely involved in partisan or electoral politics directly (Pempel, 1992, p. 
21). Image IV is usually a typical pluralist policy making process, when Mobs, Soldiers and 
Masters are involved. It is important to analyze which type of Zokugiin articulates pluralist 
interest. If those Zokugiins are unorganized Mobs or disciplined Soldiers from their Masters 
or Generals, their influence on policymaking cannot be represented the pluralist approach.  
 
From Image I to Image IV, the role of politicians and bureaucrats is getting progressively 
blurred. In Image I, their roles are entirely dichotomized as policy makers and policy 
implementers. This research excluded the possibility of such absolute distinction of roles 
between politicians and bureaucrats from the beginning, based on political and interest 
dynamics in reality. Image II shows the supremacy of politics over the bureaucracy. 
According to this model, it is possible to lead bureaucratic rationality for politicians by 
their strong legitimacy on the policy direction. In Image III, as both concerns their own 
internal politics, the collaborative interaction is possible. In Image IV, by understanding 
each other’s interest deeply, they can find a common focal interest.  
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The four models of policymaking guide us in scrutinizing interaction between politicians 
and bureaucrats in different stages based on their roles and interests. However, these 
models lack deeper analysis on the nature of groups. They treat politicians and bureaucrats 
as two distinctive groups as a whole. In fact, Prime Minister and other Diet members have 
different political interests. Even inside the MOFA bureaucracy, each division had different 
approaches towards the DPRK.  
 
In this research, Waltz’s theory supports the assumption that bureaucrats and politicians 
both they concern their own political interests. As Waltz argues the domestic factors 
influences on foreign policy, the theory can provide better explanations on the Pluralism in 
policy making. On the other hand, Gourevitch’s Second Image Reversed Theory backs up 
the idea that how external constraints imposed by the international system narrow down 
policy choices. When the international factors matter more than domestic factors, applying 
Gourevitch’s theory can be applied in order to explain the Elitist model of policymaking. 
 
In order to examine the theoretical framework, next chapter will study three different cases; 
Shin Kanemaru’s visit to Pyongyang in 1991 and Junichiro Koizumi’s visits to Pyongyang 
in 2002 and 2004. 
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Table 1. Images of policymaking 
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Chapter 3. Case Studies 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, two politicians, Shin Kanemaru and Junichiro Koizumi’s visits to 
Pyongyang will testify the theoretical framework from the previous chapter. Both 
politicians made two historical agreements with North Korea attempting normalization 
between Tokyo and Pyongyang. 
 
The two politicians’ cases make two different comparative points in terms of power of 
premiership and approaches towards the abduction issue. With the consideration of these 
points, some questions and comparative points from two different cases will be raised. First 
of all, domestic and international factors, which made Kanemaru and Koizumi visit to 
Pyongyang, will be analyzed. Secondly, the different approaches from both politicians to 
the abduction issue will be examined. Kanemaru did not raise the abduction issue in 1990 
when he met Kim Il Sung, but Koizumi brought the abduction issue as an official 
diplomatic issue between Tokyo and Pyongyang. Based on the theoretical framework in 
Chapter II, the author will inquire which model of Aberbach et al.’s Images of 
Policymaking best fits each case and whether domestic, and/or international factors 
influenced the two visits to Pyongyang. 
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3.2. Background 
 
3.2.1. Abduction Talks with North Korea 
 
After two North Korean secret agents bombed a South Korean plane in 1987, Japan 
conducted concrete investigation on the rumors and suspicions on missing Japanese people. 
However, the Japanese side had not raised the abduction issue for a while at negotiations 
between two parties on diplomatic normalization. Furthermore, the abduction issue was 
removed from the official agenda of relations between Japan and the DPRK as being 
“harmful” without setting any constructive dialogue in 1995, when Pyongyang set out with 
a policy of rapprochement with Tokyo (Asmolov, 2014). 
 
The abduction issue became a critical political issue in Japanese domestic politics after 
Prime Minister Koizumi visited Pyongyang in 2002. Since that time, Japanese right-wing 
politicians such as Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe have kept their hardline stance 
toward the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK). Even though the abduction 
occurred during the 1970s and 1980s, Japan raised the abduction issue genuinely after 2002 
when Prime Minister Koizumi visited Pyongyang. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, when 
Tokyo and Pyongyang started negotiations on the normalization of relations, the abduction 
of Japanese people was not raised at all. Japan had a good chance to raise the abduction 
issue when Shin Kanemaru visited Pyongyang with the bipartisan envoy of the Liberal 
Democratic Party and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) in order to seek diplomatic 
normalization between Japan and DPRK in 1990. He could have raised the abduction issue 
using his powerful political position as a the senior LDP’s faction leader at that time and 
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the former Deputy Prime Minister in 1987 under the Nakasone Administration. Kaoru 
Matsuki, who was abducted in Madrid in May 1980, managed to send a letter to his family 
from Pyongyang. His letter must be crucial evidence proving all the rumors and suspicions 
on the abduction by North Korea were true. He also mentioned two other Japanese 
abductees, but when Shin Kanemaru visited Pyongyang in 1990, he did not mention the 
abduction issue (Sato, 2015, p.123). The fact that Kanemaru knew about the letter is still 
under debate. Whether he knew about it or not, as such critical issue related to Japanese 
people’s security and a matter of sovereignty were politicized in Japan, he could have 
talked to Kim and discussed on it, but he did not mention the issue at all.  
 
On the contrast, at the Japan-DPRK Summit Meeting held in September 2002 in 
Pyongyang, the North Korean leader Kim Jong Il admitted abduction of Japanese nationals 
North Korean secret agents during the 1970s and the 1980s. Kim's confession generated 
firm opposition to diplomatic normalization with North Korea and anger towards the 
regime among the Japanese public. Since then, due to the strong national opposition against 
diplomatic normalization with Pyongyang, Tokyo keeps its stance that there would be no 
diplomatic normalization without resolution of the abduction issue. Japan’s such stance 
towards diplomatic normalization with North Korea lasts until these days. Koizumi’ second 
trip to Pyongyang resulted in bringing back five returned abductees’ family members, but 
still, the abduction issue remains as what creates discomfort between Japan and North 
Korea with being highly politicized. Especially, during the Japan-United Sates Summit 
Meeting in Feburary 2013, Prime Minister Abe expressed his will to solve the abduction 
issue “completely” within his term and asked for Washington’s understanding and support 
(MOFA, 2015, p. 13). 
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Moreover, this issue has remained 'top priority' in Japanese politics regarding its security 
issues along with Pyongyang's missile and nuclear threats. Kim might not have expected 
that his confession would generate such negative adverse from the Japanese public. He 
thought the apology would push the summit meeting ahead towards normalization, 
however, eventually his admission of the abduction done by North Korea has been what 
hinders improving the relationship between Japan and the DPRK amplifying Japanese 
public’s anger. 
 
 
3.2.2. Abduction Policy Making in Japanese Domestic Politics 
 
The are different perspectives that who takes a leading role in the North Korea policy 
making including the abduction issue. A member of the House of Councillors, Kyoko 
Nakayama once emphasized the necessity of change in the current Japan-DPRK negotiation 
on the abduction issue led by the MOFA (Sankei News, 2015). On the other hand, Izuru 
Makihara, a professor of Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology of 
University of Tokyo, claimed that the Prime Minister’s Official Residence, known as 
Kantei, plays a key role in foreign policy under the Koizumi Cabinet (Makihara, 2013). 
These two contrasting views show that there is no apparently sole leadership in the 
abduction policy making on the surface. In order to figure out who has the key to drive the 
abduction policy, it is important to understand the relationship between Prime Minister and 
MOFA in the foreign policy making context. 
 
	 	 44	
Katsuei Hirasawa, an LDP politician, mentioned in his book that MOFA and certain 
politicians influenced by interest groups, such as the Association of Families of Victims 
Kidnapped by North Korea (Kazokukai) and the National Association for the Rescue of 
Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (Sukuukai), lead the abduction policy making 
(Hirasawa, 2004, p. 22). Therefore, there is no obvious leading actor whose role is decisive 
in the abduction issue on the surface. 
 
Elected politicians both in the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors, 
MOFA, and Kantei are the official authorities of making policies related to the abduction 
issue. However, in the abduction policy making, an unusual phenomenon is that the public 
opinion, more specifically, the anger of Japanese public towards North Korea tends to lead 
the trend of diplomacy in collusion with the interest groups of Kazokukai and Sukuukai, and 
the mass media. The public anger in Japanese society about the abduction issue became an 
excuse of stopping normalization talks with North Korea. Japanese politicians have been 
forced to state that the abduction issue is their prior security related issue to the North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons unless they do not want suicide politically (S.C. Kim, 2010, p. 
83). Also, some politicians who would like to take advantage of the issue actively involve 
in the abduction policymaking area. 
 
Whereas Gourevitch and Waltz suggest the relation between international and domestic 
politics, Aberbach et al. propose four models of interactions between bureaucrats and 
politicians. There are two types of analysis linked with each other forming the theoretical 
framework for the case studies: analyzing a state as a centric actor of all political activities, 
and segmentalizing actors inside a state such as elected politicians, bureaucrats, and interest 
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groups. The goal of this chapter is to analyze both international and domestic factors 
influencing two politicians’ visit to Pyongyang and the interaction between domestic actors 
shape Japan’s abduction policy. 
 
 
3.3. Shin Kanemaru’s Visit to Pyongyang in 1990 
 
3.3.1. International factors 
 
The end of Cold War in the late 1980s brought a new international order to Northeast Asia. 
Started from Mikhail Gorbachev’s Perestroika in 1985, the Eastern Communist bloc finally 
collapsed with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. During the transition period of the 
post-Cold War era, the conflict over ideology decreased, and the importance of peace and 
economic development was rising. Notably, the positive transition from conflict and 
discord to compromise and cooperation appeared (Woo, 2008, p.4), as Seoul declared the 
7.7 Declaration7 for unity and prosperity though the reconciliation of South and North 
Korea in 1988. Despite this progress, the relationship between Tokyo and Pyongyang could 
not quickly move forward to a friendly relationship due to the 1965 Treaty between (the 
Republic of) Korea and Japan. Japan’s Two Korea Policy, which is recognizing the two 
existing regimes in the Korean Peninsula as two separate entities hindered the smooth 
relationship between Japan and North Korea (Cho, 1967, p. 704). The issue of “Cross-
																																																								7	South	Korea’s	president	Roh	Tae	Woo	announced	a	gradual	launch	of	an	ope-door	policy	towards	North	Korea	in	1988	(Yim,	2002,	p.	42).		
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recognition8” arose over the Korean Peninsula in 1990 was another hindrance of opening a 
relationship with North Korea for Japan. Cross-recognition is that the United States and 
Japan recognize North Korea; the Soviet Union and China recognize South Korea (Kim, J., 
2014). Pyongyang rejected the idea of Cross-recognition due to the worrisome about 
stabilizing the status quo of “Two Koreas” in the Korean Peninsula (NK Chosun, 2013). 
 
However, until the late 1980s, South Korea expanded the economic trade with the Soviet 
Union and China under the Roh Tae Woo Administration (or the Sixth Republic) in a series 
of initiatives known as Nordpolitik. Based on the temporal background of détente at the end 
of the Cold War, dialogs between Tokyo and Pyongyang unfolded. Along with the situation 
surrounding Northeast Asia, Japanese political leaders were interested in opening 
negotiations with the DPRK, as South Korea was about to establish diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union and China at that time. South Korea normalized its diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union in 19909. 
 
Nevertheless, North Korea could not benefit from the proposal of Cross-Recognition 
because resolving the nuclear issue became a precondition for North Korea's normalization 
with the United States and Japan (Y. Kim, 2015, p.50). Due to the problems of half-
finished Cross-recognition the relations between Japan and North Korea stayed at the 
civilian level in limited private fishery and trade arrangements. However, the weakened 
																																																								
8 The concept of Cross-recognition was put forward by Henry Kissinger in 1975. The Cross-recognition means that the 
four great powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula, which are the United States, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union 
(Russia), recognize that there are two political entities on the Peninsula (Yim, 2000). In his proposal, recognition of the 
DPRK by the United States should be done in return for recognition of the ROK by the Communist states (Bourantonis & 
Evriviades, 1996, p. 115). 
9 The Republic of Korea normalized diplomatic relation with the Peoples’ Republic of China in 1992. As a part of 
Nordpolitik’s outcome, the ROK and the DPRK became official members of the United Nations in 1991. 
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Cold War structure in the Korean Peninsula and the collapse of the Eastern Communist 
bloc brought some changes in Japan’s foreign policy towards the Peninsula. For Japan, 
North Korea was (and still is) the only country without official diplomatic relations. 
Therefore, diplomatic normalization with the North was encouraged by a Post-Cold War 
realignment of powers. As the regime in Pyongyang experienced a sense of isolation due to 
the Sixth Republic’s active diplomatic normalization with China, the USSR and other 
former Eastern bloc countries, Pyongyang started approaching Japan through its socialist 
ally, the JSP. 
 
Pyongyang approached to Tokyo from two perspectives; first, to overcome the economic 
crisis in the early 1990s, and second, to seek for the relationship improvement with 
Washington. Due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pyongyang became unable to get 
support from Moscow for economic development and depended on a limited support from 
Beijing. North Korea expected that the economic aid from Japan in the form of the 
compensation for colonial rule in the Korean Peninsula followed after diplomatic 
normalization would be helpful for overcoming its economic crisis (Samuel Kim & Tai 
Hwan Lee, 2002, p. 97). If not, negotiating on compensation and establishment of a liaison 
office could be another choice for North Korea (S.H. Kim & Han, 1990). Furthermore, the 
doubtful view from the United States on North Korea’s nuclear development made the 
relations between Washington and Pyongyang hardened. In 1989, when a French civil 
satellite found a nuclear facility in the northern part of North Korea (Jung Ang Ilbo, 1990), 
the doubt on North Korea nuclear program was turned into worrisome. With these political 
calculations behind, Kim Il Sung warmly welcomed the LDP and JSP delegation to 
Pyongyang in 1990. 
	 	 48	
 
Japanese political leaders recognized that Japan's influence would become comparatively 
weaker than Russia and China in political dynamics in Northeast Asia, especially in the 
Korean Peninsula. As Seoul diversified its diplomatic relations through the Nordpolitik, 
policymakers in Tokyo worried about comparatively weakening their influence over the 
region. The changing environment in the region motivated Japan to pursue opening 
relationship with North Korea from both security and economic perspectives. In the 
security aspect, a friendly regime in Pyongyang was expected to provide Japan less security 
threat. After normalization, MOFA also anticipated that the compensation to be paid by 
Japan would expedite economic growth in the DPRK and it would eventually be beneficial 
to Japanese businesses. 
 
In short, the temporal background of the late 1980s, which is represented as the transition 
period to the end of Cold War, which brought diplomatic normalization between Seoul and 
Beijing and Moscow, was one of the factors leading Kanemaru to Pyongyang. As Seoul 
diversified its diplomatic relations, Tokyo had a motivation to approach Pyongyang for 
diplomatic leverage against Seoul. Murayama also said that without South Korea’s such 
active diplomacy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and China, it would be less favorable to Japan 
to pursue the improvement in diplomatic relations with North Korea (Murayama, personal 
communication, December 7, 2016). From this sense, Kanemaru’s journey was Japan’s first 
movement to testify the North’s intend of improving its relations with Japan and to check 
the cost of normalization expecting that Japan would provide economic aid. 
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3.3.2. Domestic Factors 
 
Domestically, Japan faced several political issues from the late 1980s and the early 1990s. 
Recruit Scandal and the introduction of the consumption tax influenced on the July 1989 
Upper House election, weakening the LDP’s political power. Along with the LPD’s relative 
lost, the JSP10 started rising. Shin Kanemaru, a prominent LDP politician, was asked by 
Makoto Tanabe, then the leader of the JSP, to have a summit meeting with North Korean 
leader Kim Il Sung. As explained in the previous chapter, when a foreign policy issue 
becomes highly controversial and politicized, the Prime Minister’s role became crucial. 
However, when under a weak premiership, Zokugiins’ influence becomes decisive. In 
Japanese politics, conservatives and liberals had different approaches towards North Korea 
at that time. Whereas conservatives aimed at avoiding unnecessary diplomatic conflicts 
with the United States and South Korea over the North Korean issues, liberals insisted the 
reconciliation of the relationship with the North (Kwak & S.H. Lee, 2016). In a 
circumstance, Kanemaru was a de facto power-holder in Japan, his influence was 
considerable in the North Korea policy making. In order to define factors which played 
pivotal roles for Kanemaru’s visit to Pyongyang in 1990, this section will scrutinize four 
domestic factors which led Kanemaru to Pyongyang: 1) Recruit scandal, 2) the introduction 
of the consumption tax, 3) Kanemaru as a ‘General’ type of Zokugiin of the Construction 
tribe and a faction leader, 4) the JSP, the opposition party. 
 
 
																																																								10	The JSP was known to be a friendly party to North Korea. . In addition to its link to the General Association of Korean 
Residents in Japan (Chosen Soren), the JSP maintained direct access to Pyongyang through its ties with the Korean 
Workers' Party (KWP) (Miyashita, 2003, p.167).	
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3.3.2.1. Recruit Scandal 
 
Hiromasa Ezoe, a former chairman of Recruit Cosmos, an information industry company 
engaged in publishing, communications, and human resources, was bribing politicians, 
bureaucrats, and corporate executives with Recruit shares before the shares were released in 
the stock market. According to Steve Sjudderud, it is believed that Ezoe gave out almost a 
million shares and the market value of the stock nearly doubled when it went out to the 
public, giving the illicit recipients massive amount of profits (Sjuggerud, 2007). Seventeen 
members of Diet were involved in the scandal, but later another 30 politicians were found 
to have received special favors from Recruit including Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, 
former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister 
Kiichi Miyazawa, and CCS Takao Fujinami (Hoover, 2012, p. 258). As the result of this 
bribery scandal, Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita resigned, and 16 politicians were 
prosecuted. After the Recruitgate, the LDP lost the election of the House of Councillors in 
1989 and the House of Representatives in 1990. This scandal brought the collapse of the 
LDP and reflective benefits to the JSP lead by Doi Takako, a charismatic female leader 
with clean image. She made an appeal to the public with her integrity (Japan Times, 2014), 
and uprightness stood out in the chaotic Japanese domestic politics stained with the bravery 
scandal. 
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3.3.2.2. Introduction of the Consumption Tax 
 
The introduction of a consumption tax in Japan, under Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira the 
implementation of a general consumption tax was proposed to increase public finances. 
However, this plan was shortly abandoned due to a severe public backlash in the October 
general election in 1979 (Nippon.com, 2012). In 1987, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone 
submitted a draft sales tax bill to the Diet, but he also dropped the plan due to a widespread 
public opposition. In December 1988 under Takeshita Administration, the consumption tax 
bill was passed and in April 1989 at 3% consumption tax was introduced; soon after, Prime 
Minister Takeshita was forced to resign after the Recruitgate. The introduction of the 
consumption tax drove the LDP into the corner. At two by-elections held in 1989 in 
Fukuoka constituency and Niigata constituency, the JSP won against the LDP. Also, at the 
15th General Election of the House of Councillors held on July 23, 1989, the LDP 
experienced a historic defeat. The LDP got only 36 seats out of the contested 126 seats 
(Kato, 2003, p. 180). On the other hands, the JSP won 45 seats out of the 90 seats won by 
the opposition party. Along with the Recruit Scandal, the introduction of the consumption 
tax made the public not support the LDP, and the Socialists could attract the voters because 
of their consistent opposition to the consumption tax. 
 
 
3.3.2.3. Kanemaru as a ‘General’ type of Zokugiin 
 
The Pyongyang visit in September 1990 has a significant meaning that Kanemaru, an 
influential political leader, met the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung and started talking 
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with North Korea. Kim wanted to have a summit meeting with Kanemaru, and allegedly he 
asked the JSP to arrange a meeting with Kanemaru (Yomiuri Shimbun, April 8 1989). At 
that time, North Korea had faced a severe economic and diplomatic hardship. According to 
the Board of National Unification of the ROK, the economic growth rate of North Korea in 
1989 was 2.4%, which is 0.6% lower than the previous year. North Korea recorded 900 
million USD trade deficit, and its factory was operating only at 45% of the capacity due to 
the shortage of energy and raw materials (Miyata, 1990a). In order to overcome such 
economic hardship, Pyongyang decided to talk to Japan expecting the compensation for the 
colonial time from 1910 to 1945. He was the leader of the Takeshita faction, the biggest 
faction in the LDP, and after the resignation of Prime Minister Takeshita for Recruitgate, 
his role. 
 
He served as Minister of Construction from 1972 to 1974 in the Tanaka Cabinet11. This 
career made him a key construction tribe politician (建設族) as he became a major conduit 
in evaluating and granting construction contracts and projects. With the vast amount of 
budget allocated to him and Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s support, Kanemaru got the 
reputation of a powerful and influential politician, who had business relations with 
construction companies (Schlesinger, 1999, p. 216). 
 
																																																								11	Temporarily, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka put a slogan of “Restructure the Japanese Archipelago” along with 
Japan’s rapid economic growth policy in the early 1970s. His “restructuring” plan aimed at reducing the gap between rich 
cities and rural areas by promoting construction projects such as railroads, roads, dams, waterways and so on (Kruze, 
2015). Construction tribe members including Kanemaru, protected bid-rigging groups of construction corporates and 
helped them win contracts in exchange for election campaign donations and electioneering support (Bowen, 2003, p. 89).   	
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Eric Johnston introduces a story of Kanemaru and Kim Il Sung’s helicopter tour above 
local river sides in his JPRI working paper. He insists that as an influential construction 
zoku politician, securing construction material for his supporters from the industry might be 
a substantial interest for Kanemaru. When Kanemaru and his envoys took a view of the 
Pyongyang area by a helicopter, Kim’s intention was making Kanemaru interested in the 
high-quality river sand on the Daedong River containing low salt which can produce 
excellent quality of concrete (Johnston, 2004, p. 4) for possible business opportunities in 
the future. The construction industry is an attractive industry more to politicians who wish 
to be re-elected a sufficient amount of election campaign fund. Kanemaru, once the 
minister of construction, established personal connections and influenced construction 
expenditure to benefit his followers (Muramatsu, Iqbal, Kume, 2001, p. 120-124). 
 
Miyashita’s view on Kanemaru has something in common with Johnston’s view. Whereas 
Johnston focuses on Kanemaru’s status as an influential politician belonging to the 
construction tribe, Miyashita highlights his position of a foreign aid distributor. Japan's 
foreign aid, which would follow after the normalization, was expected to yield a significant 
amount of political fund from contractors undertaking those projects (Miyashita, 2003). 
Kanemaru was in the position of influencing the distribution of foreign aid considering his 
political status as “Godfather” of the LDP and the leader of the construction tribe. Once the 
opening of DPRK started, the business opportunities could be advantageous for his political 
machine. His concerning policy area was not only limited within the construction industry. 
As votes from rural agricultural constituencies was (is) one of the major political machines 
for the LDP (Rosenbluth, Saito, & Yamada, 2011), interests of the agricultural tribe 
(Norinzoku) in the improvement of relation with North Korea should be into Kanemaru’s 
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consideration. The agricultural tribe expected the food aid possibly provided to the North 
after reconsolidation to reduce the government’s rice stock and increase demand in rice and 
price in the domestic market (Hughes, 2006, p. 471). 
 
However, according to Kenichi Miyata’s article in AERA of Asahi Shimbun, both 
Kanemaru and Tanabe had no intention to normalize with North Korea from the beginning. 
They prepared the journey to Pyongyang assuming that there would be no diplomatic 
normalization (Miyata, 1990b). Kenemaru was on the position of maximizing each Zoku’s 
benefits, but considering his tentative role of both a policymaker and an implementer, he 
sought domestic breakthrough via diplomacy. 
 
 
3.3.2.4. The Japanese Socialist Party, as the opposition party 
 
The Japanese Socialist Party took the softest approach towards North Korea among the 
Japanese political parties. Along with the connection with the Chosen Soren, the JSP kept 
maintaining its direct linkage to North Korea’s Korea Workers’ Party (Miyashita, 2003, p. 
167). The JSP started gaining support from the public when the LDP faced severe political 
hardship due to a series of political issues such as the Recruitgate and the attempt to 
introduce consumption tax since the late 1980s. When Takako Doi became the chairwoman 
of the JSP in 1986, along with her popularity she broadened the base of the party’s support 
by working with women’s organizations and making a campaign against the consumption 
tax, which was planed to be introduced by the government. Under her leadership, her party 
reached 136 seats with approximately 25% of the vote in 1990 (Lamb, 2015, p. 137). 
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Pyongyang clinched a deal of Kanemaru’s visit by using its contact with the JSP, rather 
than MOFA, the official diplomatic body. For the JSP, it was an excellent opportunity to let 
the Japanese government and the LDP confirm that the JSP had a single connection to 
North Korea. However, MOFA somehow let the JSP to be a contact with North Korea. 
By the defeats at two elections, the 1955 system, which was the LDP’s near one-party rule 
in Japanese politics, was step into being collapsed. Until the LDP and the JSP coalition 
government was established in 1994, the LDP had been on a downturn. The LDP faced an 
overwhelming defeat at the House of Councillor election in 1989.  Reacting to the LDP’s 
money politics, the public gave a grave defeat to the LDP in the 1989 House of Councillors 
election (Buckley, 2006, p. 282). Compared to the previous election in 1986 when the LDP 
occupied the greater majority taking 143 seats out of 252 seats, the election in 1989 brought 
the LDP 109 seats out of 252 seats. In contrast, the JSP increased its occupation at the 
Upper Houser from 41 to 68 (House of Councillor, n.d.). Whereas in 1986, the LDP 
occupied 300 seats and the JSP took 85 seats out of 512 seats in the Lower House, the LDP 
was handed 257 seats, and the JSP achieved a quantum leap as they got 136 seats (House of 
Representative, 2016). As the opposition party gained power, the cooperation from JSP 
became necessary to conduct the political affairs including government operations. These 
sequences of success at elections showed disarray in the LDP following the Recurit Scandal 
and the introduction of consumption tax, but also her ‘Madonna strategy’ of encouraging 
numbers of women to stand as JSP candidates performed significantly (Stockwin, 2003, p. 
44). 
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3.3.3. The Abduction Issue 
 
Johnston (2004) assesses Kanemaru’s visit as a major step towards peace and reducing 
tension in East Asia, but he points out that the meeting was left out the question of the 
Japanese abductees. When Kanemaru and Tanabe visited Pyongyang to attend the meeting 
with Kim Il Sung, the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea was not even a topic. 
Tanabe insisted that they did not know the existence of Japanese abductees at the moment 
of the meeting with Kim, and if he knew it both Kanemaru and he would include the 
abduction issue in the discussion (Yomiuri Shimbun, September 22 2002). However, two 
years before Kanemaru and Tanabe’s journey to Pyongyang, the abduction issue was raised 
in the Budget Committee of the Diet during the inquiry session regarding the terrorist 
attack against a Korean Airline flight. An LDP politician, Seiroku Kajiyama, the Chairman 
of the National Public Safety Commission at that time answered that it was highly possible 
that a series of abduction of Japanese people were committed by North Korean secret 
agents (Yomiuri Shimbun, October 1 2002). Thus, Tanabe’s claim at that time is not 
convincing. When such a big issue was raised, Kanemaru, as an influential politician must 
have known about it. It is safe to assume that neither Kanemaru nor Tanabe had the 
intention to raise the abduction issue against Kim at that time. 
 
According to a series of articles about Kanemaru’s visit to Pyongyang and the abduction 
issue published by Yomiuri Shimbun in 2002, the top priority of the talks with Kim was 
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neither diplomatic normalization nor resolution of the abduction issue; rescuing fishermen 
of the Fujisanmaru 1812. 
 
Hajime Ishii, an LDP member of the House of Representatives from Hyogo who made a 
pre-visit to Pyongyang before Kanemaru and Tanabe’s visit on September 4th, 1990, asked 
Kim Yong Soon, a dominant figure in the KWP, about Toru Ishioka’s letter from 
Pyongyang. The letter said that he was abducted in Europe and living in North Korea with 
other abductees including Keiko Arimoto. Secretary Kim Yong Soon spoke with a grave 
look and replied:  “Sir, what kind of evidence such a paper can be? Do you have any 
evidence that it is not a slander made by South Korea?”  (Yomiuri Shimbun, December 25 
2002). Such an aggressive reaction was predicted, but Ishii had to step back from raising 
the abduction issue to North Korea because of other priorities including the resolution of 
the Fujisanmaru 18 incident. Kim Il Sung indicated to the Japanese delegations that after 
Kanemaru’s visit, the Fujisanmaru 18 issue, that two fishermen were detained in North 
Korea for eight years, would be solved. In exchange for it, the DPRK demanded 
compensation for Japan’s colonial rule. As a result, the agenda of inter-party dialogue in 
Pyongyang were limited to possible diplomatic normalization, resolution of the 
Fujisanmaru 18 incident, and colonial compensation (Hughes, 2013, p. 82). As Ishii 
described, the Japanese delegation could not raise the abduction issue in order to avoid 
distraction on the Fujisanmaru issue. 
 
																																																								
12 The Fujisanmaru 18 incident is that two fishermen of the ship were detained by North Korea. They were captured by 
North Korean coastal guards in 1983, and release in October 1990, a month after Kanemaru and Tanabe’s visit to 
Pyongyang. 
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There was a tacit agreement between Kanemaru and Tanabe not to raise any issue that 
might hinder solving the Fujisanmaru 18 incident. Both of them aimed at the release of two 
fishermen of Fujisanmaru 18, which was more important than raising the abduction issue, 
which could hinder the progress of the talk with Kim. 
 
 
3.3.4. Politician – Bureaucrats interaction 
 
Before Kanemaru and Tanabe traveled to Pyongyang, there were pre-negotiation for the 
Summit meeting twice, once in Paris and Tokyo. According to Keiji Kobayashi, a reporter 
of Asahi Shimbun’s editorial department at that time, the first closed meeting between 
MOFA and the KWP officially started on March 28, 1990, in Paris, France (Asahi Shimbun, 
December 11 1990). This session was conducted as a top confidential matter, thus the 
United States and ROK did not get any prior notice from Japan. Both parties negotiated the 
release of the Fujisanmaru 18 fishermen, use of communication satellite, and the 
establishment of a direct air route between Japan and DPRK. These issues discussed in 
Paris almost overlapped with the issues Kanemaru talked in Pyongyang with Kim. After 
four months, two parties met again in Tokyo to finalize the memorandum exchanged 
between the bipartisan advance team of Hajime Ishii from the LDP and Wataru Kubo from 
the JSP and the KWP on September 4 1990 (Tanaka, 2007, p. 63). In conclusion, the Three 
Party Declaration is based on the first draft of the Declaration written by MOFA. 
 
However, in contrast to the cooperation at the first stage of the negotiation on Kanemaru’s 
visit, MOFA dismissed the Three-Party Declaration as an informal consultation, by which 
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the Japanese government would not abide (Miyashita, 2003, p 166). MOFA originally 
agreed to the Kanemaru mission to open a dialogue with North Korea and in order to solve 
bilateral issues such as the Fujisanmaru’s fishermen and compensation issues. However, 
what Kanemaru promised Kim was more than MOFA’s speculation of establishing 
diplomatic relations and the range of compensation. Furthermore, the content of the Three 
Party Declaration was also problematic for Japan considering the relationship with its ally, 
the United States and South Korea, as the Declaration is violating MOFA’s policy 
principles vis-à-vis North Korea13. 
Kanemaru promised Kim Il Sung that Pyongyang could expect an economic cooperation 
package worth 80 billion U.S. dollar from Japan upon diplomatic normalization. He also 
indicated that Japan would make reparation for the loss of North Koreans during the 36-
year-long colonial ruling period and after 1945. The United States criticized Kanemaru 
because compensating for the loss during the Cold War period would mean that Japan 
indirectly admitted the responsibility of Washington. 
 
Being apart from the question of compensating for the 36 years of the colonial period, 
recompensing for 45 years of loss of North Korean people during the Cold War was far 
beyond the scope of the treaty with the government in Seoul and the limit, which could be 
accepted by Tokyo as well. The Declaration was beyond the range of Agreement on the 
Settlement of Problem concerning Property and Claims and the Economic Cooperation 
																																																								13	Tokyo’s normalization policy principles were: 1) Japan would conduct negotiations with a view toward enhancing the 
peace and stability of the entire Korean Peninsula, 2) Japan-DPRK normalization would not occur at the expense of 
friendly relations between Japan and the ROK, 3) while responding to property claims arising from Japan’s thirty-six-year 
colonial rule, Japan would not compensate North Korea for the postwar period, and 4) North Korea’s acceptance of 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of nuclear facilities is critical to Japan’s national security (Fouse, 
2006, p.139). 
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between the Republic of Korea and Japan14. Whereas this treaty only recognizes “claims” 
concerning property, rights and interests of the ROK and Japan, the Declaration states 
“compensation”. Thus, from MOFA’s perspective, Japan’s approach to North Korea should 
not jeopardize the relations with the South (p. 87). The South Korean government opposed 
the contents of the declaration and it could cause more disharmonies in the region. As a 
result, Kanemaru had to make an apology to the ROK as MOFA, directed gaining the trust 
of Japan’s allies by speeding down the pace of reconciliation with the North (Fouse, 2004, 
p. 106). 
 
Such contextual differences between Kanemaru and MOFA effected MOFA’s decision to 
dismiss the Declaration. According to former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, 
implementing the summit meeting’s result might be possible if it was within MOFA’s 
acceptable range. Based on his opinion, MOFA was also seeking way of opening 
relationship with North Korea, but based on gradual progress, rather than sudden 
diplomatic normalization (Murayama, personal communication, December 7, 2016). Aera 
(1990) also says that Kanemaru did not expect diplomatic normalization with North Korea. 
Kanemaru knew that the Three Party Declaration including compensating for 45 years of 
the post-war period would not be implemented by MOFA. He was well aware that Kim Il 
Sung wanted to approach him instead of MOFA, because of the “Two Koreas” problem 
15(Yomiuri Shimbun, September 22 2002, Interview with Tanabe). 
																																																								
14 On June 22,1965, the Republic of Korea and Japan signed the Treaty on Basic Relations Between Japan and the 
Republic of Korea in order to (re) establish their diplomatic relationship. After the 14 years of intensive negotiations 
between the two governments, they agreed to settle the relationships.   
On the same day, they also signed the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property & Claims and on 
Economic Cooperation.	
15 Basically, both South and North Korea domestically do not recognize each other. Both insist that they are only 
legitimate regime in the Korean Peninsula.   
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An assumption is that both Kanemaru, an influential politician at that time, and MOFA did 
not set forth the Declaration as the starting point of diplomatic normalization. For 
Kanemaru, the Declaration was a political showmanship to respond factional and tribal 
interests in order to get the integrity inside of the LDP, and get cooperation from the JSP 
regarding domestic policy issues such as the introduction of the consumption tax and 
Recruit Scandal, and show off his political influence. For MOFA, the ROK’s 
diversification of diplomatic channels motivated the ministry to approach to North Korea at 
that time, in order to react diplomatic isolation in the region. Only the share ground was 
rescuing fisherman from both political and bureaucratic point of views. 
 
 
3.4. Junichiro Koizumi’s Visit to Pyongyang in 2002 
 
3.4.1. International factors 
 
The international security environment in Northeast Asia since the late 1990s drastically 
changed as the North Korea’s nuclear development and missile tests escalated tension in 
the region. This section analyzes two international factors, which possibly influenced on 
Koizumi’s trip to Pyongyang. One is the North Korea’s visualized nuclear development and 
launching missiles. The other one is the implication of Washington’s policy change towards 
Pyongyang in early 2002 based on the “Axis of Evil” statement. Finding how these factors 
made Koizumi decide to meet Kim Jung Il and figuring out how much these factors 
influenced on his decision form the focus of this part. 
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3.4.1.1. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapon Development and Missile Launches 
 
When Koizumi made a journey to Pyongyang for the first time in 2002, tension 
surrounding North Korea’s missile testing was escalating in Northeast Asia. In 1998, 
DPRK launched a long-range Taepodong-1 ballistic missile over the Japanese Archipelago. 
Since that time, North Korea’s possession of long-range missiles became one of the 
security concerns for Japan. Moreover, Pyongyang rejected the IAEA’s nuclear inspection 
in 1996. In April 1996 and June 1997, Washington and Pyongyang had negotiations on 
missiles. While the United States required producing, developing, exporting and deploying 
missiles, the DPRK rejected the requirements and asked rewarding in exchange of banning 
export missiles. In 1998, North Korea’s national broadcasting station made a statement that 
it would continue developing missiles in order to counter America’s threat unless the U.S. 
lifted economic sanctions. From the end of 1998 and early 1999, several negotiations were 
held between Washington and Pyongyang over the nuclear issues. 
 
Washington’s strategy that intended change in the Kim regime through negotiation faced 
policy shifting when George W. Bush assumed the presidency of the United States in 
January 2001(KINU, 2014, p. 16-22). Throught the year, Bush’s hard-line policy toward 
the North increased tension surrounding the DPRK’s nuclear weapons. 
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3.4.1.2. The “Axis of Evil” Statement by George W. Bush 
 
In early 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush made the “Axis of evil” statement that 
condemned the regimes in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea of sponsoring terrorism, starving 
their citizens, exporting biological and chemical weapons, and developing nuclear weapons. 
Shinzo Abe, then Deputy CCS of Japan at that time, stated on an interview with Fuji TV, 
that Japan understood President Bush’s position that Pyongyang seriously threatened the 
international security and Japan shared the suspicion and opposition to the DPRK 
suppressing its people (Nautilus Institute, 2002). George W Bush’s Axis of Evil statement 
in January 29 2002 implied that Washington changed its policy toward Pyongyang to a 
hardline policy. Nonetheless the statement lied on the extent of driving regime change, 
Pyongyang has kept developing nuclear weapons without any changes in its behavior. 
 
In such situation, Hitoshi Tanaka, the Deputy Minister of MOFA and Prime Minister 
Koizumi’s advisor, flew to Washington D.C. to meet Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary 
of States and James Kelly, Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, in July 2002 and informed them of Koizumi’s plan to visit to Pyongyang in 
September. Regardless of the American side’s warning messages that the visit might be too 
early to meet Kim Jung Il, Koizumi went to Pyongyang as Direct General of the Asian and 
Oceanian Bureau, Hitoshi Tanaka who empathized the independent foreign policy, had 
planned the trip. Based on Japan’s concerns about North Korea’s missile and nuclear 
threats, Koizumi’s visit implied that Japan would change its North Korea policy. So far, 
Tokyo had kept pace with Washington’s policy towards Pyongyang in a passive way, but as 
Koizumi decided to hold a summit meeting with Kim without prior agreement with 
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Washington showed Tokyo’s will to engage in the Korean Peninsula unto itself more 
actively. 
 
 
3.4.1.2. Sunshine Policy by Kim Dae Jung 
 
The government of Republic of Korea promoted a “sunshine policy” towards the North 
Korea under the Kim Dae Jung Administration from 1997. Goals of the policy were 
dismantling the Cold War structure in the Korean Peninsula, remedying the pain of people 
separated in the South and North, and demining call on peace and cooperation in the 
Peninsula (Ministry of Unification of Republic of Korea, 2002, p. 5-6). In February 20 
2002, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung described his policy intention to terminate the 
confrontation and bring peace and prosperity on the Peninsula at the opening ceremony of 
Dorasan Station16 with U.S. President George W Bush in attendance (D.J. Kim, 2002). At 
the end of speech, he urged Washington’s policy change towards Pyongyang indirectly. 
Nonetheless, Bush repeated his hardline stance with empathizing the role of the alliance for 
the inter-Korean relations. 
 
Hitoshi Tanaka (2005) evaluated the sunshine policy as a factor to make Koizumi’s 
Pyongyang visit possible (p. 26-27). Kim’s policy change was an opportunity for Japan’s 
diplomacy. Based on its principle, Japan was/is not able to progress the relationship with 
North Korea, but the inter-Korean détente mood provided such an environment where 																																																								
16 Dorasan station is a railway station on the Gyeongui Line (from Seoul to Sinuiju), located in the northernmost frontier 
of South Korea’s railway. It is 56km far from Seoul and 205km from Pyongyang.  	
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Japan could approach to North Korea. As South Korea aimed at decreasing security tension 
in Northeast Asia, the Kim administration was supportive to Koizumi’s summit meeting in 
Pyongyang (Kwak & Joo, 2003, p. 128). 
 
Another aspect of the sunshine policy is South Korea’s independent policy initiative 
expressing its antipathy towards the US-led engagement in North Korea policy (Sato, 2006, 
p. 77).  Koizumi’s Pyongyang trip indicated Japan’s pursuing its independent Korean 
Peninsula engagement deviating from that of the United States. The Asia Bureau’s policy 
direction was the fundamental structural reform of Japan’s diplomacy on its own (Tanaka, 
2009, p. 81-136). It was possible for Hitoshi Tanaka to plan the Japan-DPRK summit 
meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi and Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka’s support. 
To sum it up, Seoul’s sunshine policy’s perspective on an idealistic inter-Korean relation 
and direction of interdependent engagement in North Korea enabled Tokyo to seek a more 
progressive enlargement of North Korea policy. 
 
 
3.4.2. Domestic factors 
 
Sometimes politicians seek a diplomatic success to overcome domestic political hardships. 
Koizumi was also one of those politicians who knew how to find a way out of the domestic 
political difficulties and how to shift the public’s attention from internal matters to 
international matters. In 2002, the reshuffle of Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka, a popular 
politician among the public, brought a rapid decline in the Koizumi Cabinet’s approval rate. 
Also, the slowdown of some structural reforms such as “Big Bang” financial reforms and 
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the establishment of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy put Koizumi in trouble by 
decreasing the approval rate. This section illustrates how such a series of events at home 
drove Koizumi to Pyongyang. 
 
 
3.4.2.1. The Reshuffle of Makiko Tanaka 
 
On January 30th, 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi reshuffled Foreign Minister Makiko 
Tanaka (Korea Economics, 2002). She was a popular politician with high public support, 
viewed as the “Mother of Koizumi Administration.” Also, she is well known as the 
daughter of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. Japanese people have a nostalgic 
memory for former Prime Minister Tanaka whose political career was paralleled with 
Japan’s high economic growth and prosperity from the devastation of the World War II. 
With such a family background and her own image of being openly critical to other 
political leaders and a relaxed public image using heavy local dialect rather than speaking 
formal standard Japanese, she gained popularity among public (BBC, 2001). 
 
In the 2001 electoral campaign, Koizumi took advantage of Tanaka’s popularity. During 
the election campaign, she worked for Koizumi at the campaign site and also suggesting the 
image of breaking the LDP. Koizumi appealed public with the slogan of “reforming the 
LDP” and she accounted a big portion of his strategy challenging the image of male-
dominated LPD and booting out the anti-reform old guard (Klemperer-Markman, 2014, p. 
207). He established his image as an “outsider” in the LDP, not relying on any factional 
support (Derichs, 2013, p. 334). He was the first LDP president and prime minister of Japan 
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who was selected outside of the traditional factional power struggles (Shinoda, 2009, p. 89). 
His overwhelming victory earning 298 votes out of 487 votes, gave him enough legitimacy 
to compose his own cabinet by appointing major positions and he rewarded her 
contribution by appointing her the Foreign Minister. Koizumi was well acknowledged that 
her role during the election was significant. He told Taku Yamasaki, a prominent LDP 
politician, that she deserved at least the Foreign Minister (Yamasaki, 2016, p. 219).  
 
However, her frequent tongue slips and conflicts with MOFA bureaucrats provided reasons 
for Koizumi to reshuffle her although she contributed to the creation of Koizumi Cabinet 
(S.J. Park, 2002). As Tanaka was an undiplomatic Foreign Minister, her qualification for 
the position was questioned since her appointment. After assuming the office as foreign 
minister, she brought many conflicts with bureaucrats within MOFA calling the 
organization the “Pandemonium”. Especially, when she was taking office as the foreign 
minister, she was known to be an enemy of Muneo Suzuki17, a senior LDP politician. The 
feud between Tanaka and Suzuki started from January 2002 as she criticized Yoshiji 
Nogami, deputy foreign minister, for his excluding two non-governmental organizations 
from the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan because of 
Suzuki’s pressure (Asahi Shimbun, September 22 2002). Due to the confrontation among 
Tanaka, Suzuki and Nogami, Koizumi fired Tanaka and Nogami, and urged Suzuki to 
resign from his post as the chairman of the House of Representatives. 
 
																																																								
17 Muneo Suzuki, who is one of powerful foreign affair tribe politicians (Gaimuzoku), genuinely engaged in the territorial 
dispute over the Northern Territories with Russia. At that time, Suzuki, who held the posts of deputy foreign minister and 
parliamentary deputy, had a great influence on MOFA officials with his well-built experience as a member of the LDP’s 
subcommittee on foreign affairs. 
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After the firing of Tanaka, the cabinet approval rate declined from 80% mark to 50%. 
(Soeya, Welch, Tadokoro, 2010, p.163). The reshuffling of Tanaka was one of the reasons 
why Koizumi lost the trust of the public. Although a sharp decline in the cabinet approval 
rate was expected, disharmony inside MOFA made reshuffling of Tanaka unavoidable. 
 
3.4.2.2. Slowing Down of Reforms 
 
Japan, still the world second largest economy in the late 1990s and early 2000, had faced a 
severe economic downturn after the Bubble Economy. According to Park Sung Jun’s article 
in Sisa Journal (2002), around 160 thousand of Japanese people filed for personal 
bankruptcy. Along with personal bankruptcy, the unemployment rate rocketed to 5 %. The 
Gross National Products growth in 2001 recorded a negative point for the first time after 
the World War II, and the weakening of Yen was lasting. The possibility of bankruptcy of 
banks was high, and the credibility of the Japanese government was also damaged18. 
 
When Koizumi came into office in April 2001 with the 78% of public approval rate, he 
brought the plan of structural reform in order to clean up of bad bank loans, privatization, 
deregulation and administrative reform (Scheiner, 2006, p. 34)19. However, his reform plan 
was not going smoothly. The conservative LDP members, bureaucrats and interest groups 
having connections with those politicians and bureaucrats hindered Koizumi’s structural 
reforms. Especially, his slogan of “structural reforms without sanctuary” faced severe 
opposition by the LDP. His plan was criticized for presenting vague and lacking concrete 																																																								
18 Moody’s, the international rating company made a downward adjustment of the Japanese government’s credibility rate 
from Aa2 to Aa3 in December 2001. This rate was the lowest rate among the developed countries (Park, 2002). 	
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proposals by media and LDP big wings, who disagreed with major change lacked the 
LDP’s support on his reform plan. The Road Traffic Authority of Japan reacted severely 
against Koizumi’s such reform. In 2001, Koizumi declared no more investigation with the 
government expenditure into projects of the Road Traffic Authority, which was to be 
privatized along with the Japan Post. By June 2002, the cabinet approval rate declined to 37% 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2001). Due to the severely adverse reaction from the LDP and declining 
public support on his reform plan, Koizumi needed to find a momentum to manage the 
internal affairs, which would possibly improve the cabinet approval. (Japanese) voters are 
interested in issues. Koizumi, who is evaluated as a populist politics, knew this nature of 
voters and sought a domestic political breakthrough from diplomacy. As a result, acording 
to Asahi Shimbun’s poll, his cabinet’s approval rate rose from 51% to 60% immediately 
after the Pyongyang Meeting (Shinoda, 2013, p.106). 
 
3.4.3. The Abduction Issue 
 
Although Koizumi is the first Japanese Prime Minister who went to North Korea to have a 
summit meeting with the Kims, other politicians also went to North Korea in order to solve 
the abduction issue after the Kazokukai was established in 1997. Yoshiro Mori went to 
North Korea with the Japanese delegation in order to discuss the resolution of the abduction 
issue for the first time in November 1997 under the Hashimoto cabinet. However, this trip 
did not result any meaningful result concerning the abduction issue as the North Korean 
counterparts strongly denied the abduction was happening (Nonaka, 2003, p. 298~299). In 
1999, Tomiichi Murayama also went to North Korea with the bipartisan delegation of the 
LDP and the JSP. His delegation team and the North Koreans agreed on resuming the talks 
	 	 70	
for diplomatic normalization between Japan and North Korea. The abduction issue was 
passed to the Red Cross meeting as an issue of mysteriously missing people (Wada, 2007). 
 
After Mori became the Prime Minister, he showed interests in fence mending with North 
Korea and hoped to have a Summit meeting (Suh, 2000). In 2000, the inter-Korean relation 
and the relations between the North and the United States improved, leaving Japan with a 
sense of isolation in Northeast Asia. In January 2001, Mori sent his Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Hidenao Nakagawa to Singapore for a meeting with Kang Suk Ju, North Korea’s first 
Deputy Foreign Minister. Kang said that “the issue of missing Japanese people” and other 
issues could be solved at a prospective summit meeting between Mori and Kim. The Asian 
Bureau was told to set up a summit meeting, but in April, as Mori resigned from 
premiership and the plan dissolved.  
 
On the contrast to Mori and Murayama’s visits, Koizumi made a visible result from the 
summit meeting with Kim Jong Il. Koizumi’s first visit to Pyongyang in 2002 led to Kim’s 
apology on the fact of abducting Japanese nationals during the 1970s and the 1980s, and 
five abductees returned to Japan. Despite Kim’s admission and apology, Koizumi had to 
face increasingly severe domestic pressure to take strict measures against North Korea in 
order to solve the abduction issue and rescue the rest of the abduction victims who were 
suspected to be alive despite North Korea reported them dead (Hook, 2010, p. 68). The 
anger of Japanese public towards the regime in Pyongyang about the abduction issue was 
increased. Voiced criticism on the Kim regime gained power among Japanese public. 
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The abduction issue became one of the key issues in the making of North Korea in Japan 
based on the national attention, which is a notable phenomenon that the public opinion 
tends to lead the trend of diplomacy. In other words, families of abduction victims and 
public opinions have led the change in how Japan’s diplomacy should be since the Prime 
Minister Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in 2002 (Hirasawa, 2004, p.145). Many different 
actors such as public opinions, interest groups such as Kazokukai and Sukuukai, and mass 
media created this phenomenon. Since August 30 2002, when the Japanese government 
announced Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang, Japanese media covered North Korea related 
issues, mainly focused on the abduction issue. Considering that the Japanese government 
knew a series of abduction of Japanese people including Hasuike from the beginning 
(Nishioka, 2006, p. 64), starting negotiation when the public interest on the issue increased 
can be interpreted that Koizumi’ trip was targeting at domestic political gains. 
 
Mass media had a great influence on forming negative public opinions towards North 
Korea occurring sympathy on the abduction victims’ families. On September 17 2002, 
NHK canceled the live stream of the Pyongyang Summit and instead, broadcasted the scene 
that families were crying in front of camera after hearing abductees’ information. 
According to Toru Hasuike (2015), a brother one of abductees, said that when the Summit 
meeting was held in Pyongyang the families were at the detached office of MOFA and 
there were CCS Yasuo Fukuda, deputy foreign minister Shigeo Uetake, and Diet members 
such as Katsuei Hirasawa and Genzo Yoneda (p. 98~100). The possible implication is that 
MOFA, Kantei and Diet were already aware of Kim’s admission and apology on the 
horizon. One (or more) of these three bodies manipulated the public opinion towards North 
Korea through mass media. 
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Under the Koizumi Cabinet, the abduction issue was certainly not the most concerning 
security issue even though there was a lot of domestic pressure from the concerned groups. 
Linking to the American alliance factor, the Bush Administration supported Koizumi’s 
effort on the abduction issue, but reportedly pressed its concern on Japan’s economic aid 
towards North Korea before resolving the missile and nuclear issues (Niksch, 2010, p. 
CRS-5). Koizumi’s journey to Pyongyang made a remarkable turning point in Japan’s 
foreign policy towards the DPRK. Kim’s admission and apology for the abduction of 
Japanese people made the Japanese public infuriated. 
 
 
3.4.4. The Bureaucrats-Politicians Interaction 
 
Hitoshi Tanaka, a high-ranking foreign ministry’s officer, had pre-negotiations with his 
personal connection with North Korean officers, especially Mr. X known to be a high-rank 
official in Pyongyang in order to resolve the abduction issue. The North Korean side would 
like to negotiate on compensation issues, on the contrary, the Japan side heavily discussed 
on the abduction issue20. Based on the agreement from both parties that the North admitted 
the abduction, the summit meeting was scheduled in September 2002 (Tanaka, 2009, p. 
110). 
 
																																																								
20 The meeting was not originally planned for Koizumi’s visit. Hitoshi Tanaka said that the North Koreans got an 
impression that Japan came to the negotiation in order to talk only about the abduction issue. He set the North Koreans 
forth to admit their abduction of Japanese people until Koizumi visited Pyongyang. Thus, for the further progress of the 
issue, Koizumi’s visit was decided. (Tanaka, 2009, p. 105~110). 
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However, the conflicts between the Asia and Oceanina Affairs Bureau and the North 
American Affairs Bureau inside MOFA should be taken into consideration for MOFA’s 
grand North Korea strategy. Based on the North American Bureau’s security framework, 
Japan’s security policy should be intertwined with that of the United States (H.S. Choi, 
2010, p. 216). On the other hand, the Asian Bureau led by Hitoshi Tanaka insisted that the 
Alliance with the United States be a part of Japan’s security policy and Japan should act 
more actively in Asian diplomacy, which is deeply related to Japan’s politics, security and 
economy (Tanaka, 2009, p. 90~99). Such a confrontation surrounding the U.S.-Japan 
alliance got expanded its scale to Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang. 
 
The North America Bureau is allegedly the most powerful bureau in MOFA. However, the 
fact that MOFA adapted the Asian Bureau’s policy means that there were some political 
initiatives. When Hitoshi Tanaka started negotiating with North Korea in fall 2001, Makiko 
Tanaka was the foreign minister. She has stressed the importance of Asia-focused 
diplomacy in the context of continuing her father, Kakuei Tanaka’s diplomatic direction21. 
He accomplished diplomatic normalization with the People’s Republic of China in 
September 1972. In 1976, he was prosecuted on suspicion of bribery by Lockheed, an 
American aerospace company. These factors related to her father’s political legacy 
influenced on her diplomatic direction. At her post as foreign minister, she was in capable 
of supporting Hitoshi Tanaka’s approach to North Korea. He accomplished diplomatic 
normalization with the People’s Republic of China in September 1972. In 1974, he resigned 
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from Prime Minister due to the suspicion of bribery by Lockheed22, an American aerospace 
company. These factors related to her father’s political legacy 23  influenced on her 
diplomatic direction. At her post as foreign minister, she was in capable of supporting 
Hitoshi Tanaka’s approach to North Korea. 
 
After Koizumi’s Pyongyang visit, the Kantei took the full leadership in North Korean 
policymaking including the abduction issue. Tanaka insisted returning those 5 abductees 
who returned to Japan back to North Korea after Koizumi’s visit. As he drew a plan for 
Koizumi’s Pyongyang visit, his approach to North Korea was solving issues including the 
abduction issue through dialogue. He warned Koizumi that not returning abductees might 
result in losing the communication channel with North Korea for further negotiations in the 
future (Tanaka, 2005, p. 67). On the other hand, Shinzo Abe, then Deputy CCS, claimed 
not to return them because their security was not guaranteed.  
 
The Kantei would like to use this opportunity to take a leadership over MOFA in foreign 
policy vis-à-vis North Korea. When Koizumi visited U.S. President George W Bush in his 
ranch located in Crawford, Texas, on May 22~23 2003, Tanaka proposed Koizumi not to 
use the word “pressure” regarding Japan’s North Korea strategy (Hasuike, 2015, p. 148-
149). Based on Tanaka’s attitude it is possible to see that MOFA still had soft-line 
approach towards Pyongyang at that time. However, after Koizumi’s summit meeting with 
Bush in Texas, he indicated the shift of policy direction towards the regime in Pyongyang 																																																								
22 The Lockheed bribery scandal. Lockheed Company had offered bribe to Japanese high-ranking politicians from the 
1950s to the 1970s. This scandal made him resign from the premiership in1974. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of 
the United States was speculated to influence Tanaka’s political destiny. Due to this scandal, her daughter Makiko Tanaka 
has a less favorable attitude towards the United States. 
23 Makiko Tanaka was a popular politician due to her family background. Her diplomatic principle was focusing on Asian 
diplomacy promoting friendly relationships with regional actors rather than the United States.  
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to “dialogue and pressure”. The abduction issue provided a base for Koizumi and the 
LDP’s hardline North Korea policy. The severe criticism on North Korea among the 
Japanese public allowed the Kantei to lead the abduction policy making. 
 
In sum, Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in 2002 was based upon Prime Minister’s strong 
political will with bureaucratic support. Hitoshi Tanaka’s independent diplomatic way was 
fit into Makiko Tanaka’s ideal diplomacy. Prime Minister’s visit, then with the abduction 
issue, Koizumi was able to shift its power leverage on North Korea policy against MOFA. 
MOFA bureaucrats pushed on diplomatic normalization with North Korea However, the 
abduction issue, which heated the Japanese public up with anger towards the Kim regime, 
gave enough legitimacy to Kantei to lead the abduction policy. 
 
 
3.5. Junichiro Koizumi’s Visit to Pyongyang in 2004 
 
This section intends to figure out both international and domestic factors, which led 
Koizumi to Pyongyang again 2004. Defining what kind of political deal was behind the 
scenes is the focus of this chapter with the consideration of given circumstances inside and 
out of Japan. Also, the interaction between politicians and bureaucrats will be analyzed in 
the bigger picture of powerful premiership of Koizumi, who could successfully shift the 
leadership of the North Korea policy including the abduction issue from MOFA to the 
Kantei. 
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3.5.1. International Factor 
 
After the first visit, the Kantei got the initiative in the North Korea policy including the 
abduction issue. From 2003, the regional actors established a regime to react to the growing 
nuclear threat from the DPRK. Koizumi turned up the “pressure” card in addition to 
“dialogue”. In order to define the primary factor, which led Koizumi to Pyongyang for the 
second time, it is necessary to examine the international environment in Northeast Asia 
after Koizumi’s first visit in 2002. 
 
 
3.5.1.1. Growing Nuclear Threats 
 
The second North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002 after James Kelly, the U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs traveled to Pyongyang and 
revealed that North Korea developed a uranium enrichment program. Kelly’s visit aimed at 
negotiating with North Korea on WMD, nuclear weapons development program, exporting 
of missile components, conventional force posture and humanitarian issues, but his visit 
immediately resulted in revealing the existence of High-Enriched Uranium (HEU) in North 
Korea. On October 16 2002, by issueing a statement24  after Kelly’s visit, Washington 
condemned North Korea for violating the Agreed Framework (Arms Control Association, 
2004). In November 2002, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization 
																																																								
24 Pyongyang’s HEU was for nuclear weapons and the development of nuclear weapons seriously violated the Agreed 
Framework calling upon DPRK to freeze operating and constructing nuclear reactors, which can possibly be converted a 
part of nuclear weapon, in exchange for two proliferation-resistant nuclear power reactors. 
 
	 	 77	
(KEDO)25 declared the suspension of supplying heavy fuel oil delivery to North Korea as it 
admitted its HEU program. Nevertheless the IAEA’s resolution 26 , until the Agreed 
Framework collapsed as Pyongyang withdrew from the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 
January 10 2003, the North Korea’s nuclear development had been continued. 
 
3.5.1.2. The Six-Party Talks 
 
After the Kim regime admitted the existence of enriched uranium for the development of 
nuclear weapons, Washington wanted the nuclear issue to be settled through multilateral 
diplomatic negotiations, while Pyongyang wanted bilateral talks with Washington only. In 
April 2003, China offered its brokership as a neutral mediator. The United States had 
wanted South Korea and Japan’s involvement in order to prepare “side-payments”, which 
could possibly be offered to Pyongyang to engage in nuclear disarmament. China proposed 
Russia in order to counterweight against the U.S., Japan and South Korea’s trilateral 
cooperation. Indeed, Beijing hosted the first round of the Six-Party Talk (SPT) in August 
2003 to resolve the North Korea nuclear crisis with related parties in the region. Although 
the SPT was expected to achieve meaningful resolution of the North Korean nuclear 
problem, the stakeholders of the SPT had different domestic priorities, national interests, 
and historical antagonism. Also some misunderstandings and repeated conflicts in various 
areas such as Yasukuni Shirine issue, territorial conflicts surrounding Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands and Dokdo/Takeshima Island, historical textbook, China’s Northeast Borderland 
History Project, and comfort women issue, make them difficult to cooperate on the North 																																																								
25 Based on the Agreed Framework, the United States, the ROK and Japan established it in order to reward the DPRK for 
closing its nuclear facility in Yongbyon with building two light- water reactors. 
26 The IAEA adopted a resolution condemning North Korea’s resumption of activities at its nuclear facility on January 6 
2003.	
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Korean nuclear problem. Despite other participants’ disagreement, Japan succeeded 
including the abduction issue as a topic of the Talks. It was a part of Japan’s strategy to 
press North Korea in order to make sufficient result including the abduction issue in 
exchange of normalization with Japan (The Government of Japan, N.d.). 
 
Despite the SPT, a multilateral platform for negotiations to solve the missile, nuclear 
weapons, and abduction issues, Japan’s expected outcome of the SPT especially on the 
abduction was limited. After Bush’s statement, Koizumi considered some policy changes 
towards the Kim regime. In such a circumstance, Koizumi revisited Pyongyang in May 
2004. The dissatisfying multilateral talks motivated Koizumi to go to Pyongyang in order 
to negotiate bilaterally with North Korea on the abduction issue. 
 
3.5.1.3. The U.S. Support on the Abduction Issue 
 
After Koizumi made his first visit to Pyongyang in 2002, the United States also started 
giving attention on the issue. The Bush Administration pointed North Korea as one of the 
terrorism-supporters along with Iran and Iraq in 2003 during Bush’s “axis of evil” 
statement. Since then, key people in the Administration such as President Bush, National 
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and Vice President Dick Cheney expressed their 
support. In May 2003 when Bush and Koizumi had a summit meeting, Bush condemned 
Pyongyang that an abduction is an abominable act and Washington would support Japan 
until Japan finds out whereabouts of all abductees. Rice expressed her anger about 
abduction with using the word “abhor”, and Cheney said Washington shared Japan’s 
“outrage” over the issue and the Administration supported Japan’s stance (Niksch, CSR-5, 
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2010). In February 2004, John Bolton, then secretary of state, stated that North Korea 
would be remained on the list of state sponsors of terrorism (DiFillippo, 2013, p. 107). The 
U.S. pressure on the issue led North Korea to engage in the negotiation with Japan actively. 
 
 
 
3.5.2. Domestic factor 
 
Koizumi’s visit seemed that it targeted the House of Councillors’ election in July 2004. 
When the non-payment of public pension scandal was exposed to the public, the Kantei 
released Prime Minister’s plan to visit to North Korea. Such domestic factors possibly 
influenced and are linked to the second visit as the first visit was motivated by some 
domestic factors. 
3.5.2.1. Upper House Election in July 2004 
 
Diplomacy achievement is an effective tool to attract and appeal to public before the 
election, so that Koizumi politically used his second visit to Pyongyang aiming at the 
House of Councilors election held on July 11, 2004. Hajime Izumi, an expert on Korean 
affairs, claimed that compared to Koizumi’s first visit in 2002, the second visit was 
politically calculated based more on interests in the Japanese domestic politics (Izumi, 
2004). 
 
He was able to boost the cabinet approves rates with the surprise visit to Pyongyang for the 
second time above 50 %. In 2003 the House of Representatives election, the LDP got 237 
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seats and the Komeito won 34 seats, so the ruling parties could secure the majority. 
However, as the DPJ obtained 177 seats, the party seemed to have an upturn. For the LDP 
leadership, it was necessary to impede the DPJ’s rising. At the 2004 Upper House Election, 
the LDP won 115 seats (the coalition partner Komeito gained 24 seats), and the DPJ 
obtained 103 seats out of 242 seats. Considering domestic political situation, which will be 
analyzed later in this chapter, the LDP seemed it gained victory, but compared to past times, 
this result should be regarded as a moral defeat. Kenichi Ikeda, a professor at Doshisha 
University, analyzed that the LDP was dependence on the “effect of emotional temperature” 
of the Japanese public towards Koizumi. In other words, the public’s preference for 
Koizumi was an influential factor both in the 2003 Lower House election and the 2004 
Upper House election (Ikeda, 2005, p. 45). These elections as a platform for evaluating 
politicians’ achievements put pressure on Koizumi. The North Korea card of negotiating 
the abduction issue contributed to the victory in the 2014 election. However, Koizumi 
failed to maintain the high approval rate, he gained from the trip through the rest of the year 
as the support for his Cabinet continued its descent due to the scandalous non-payment into 
public pension by Koizumi and other LDP politicians. 
 
 
3.5.2.2. The Public Pension Scandal 
 
The non-payment of public pension by many prominent politicians including Koizumi 
made the cabinet face crisis before the election. Due to this scandal, a defeat at the July 
Upper House election was predicted, so Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang was released to 
public on the same day when the scandal was disclosed to public. This scandal did not 
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directly influenced since the second trip was planned not for covering it, however, but the 
timing of exposing the visit was delicate. 
 
In May 2004, some Japanese politicians got involved in the non-payment of public pension 
scandal starting from Prime Minister Koizumi. He did not make payments into the pension 
for six years and 11 months, but he insisted that all payments were made accordingly. Isao 
Iijima, Prime Minister’s secretary had a press conference and told that the lapse was not 
illegal since it happened before 1986 when the public pension payment became compulsory 
(BBC, 2004). Many politicians from both the ruling and opposition parties were found to 
be missing payments, including seven of them from the Cabinet. The leader of the DPJ, 
Naoto Kan, and the CCS Yasuo Fukuda at that time had to step down after admitting that 
they did not make pension payments in the 1990s. Especially, Fukuda’s resignation on May 
7 intended to head off the opposition demands for resignation of six other ministers in the 
administration. The scandal was revealed in April. According to some political 
commentators, had been privately guaranteed a top minister position following the Upper 
House election in July (Lopez, 2004). 
 
The release of the non-payment of public pension contributions by prominent politicians 
including Koizumi and Fukuda, aimed at minimizing public bashing on the LDP at the 
Upper House election. On the same day when Koizumi admitted his non-payment of 
pension, he announced his second visit to Pyongyang. The visit was planned ahead of the 
pension scandal, but the timing of admitting the non-payments and announcing the second 
visit to North Korea two months before the Upper House election faced some criticism that 
Koizumi tacitly diverted the public's attention (Kabashima and Steel, 2012, p. 97). At that 
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time, as the increasing sympathy towards those abduction victims was aroused among the 
Japanese public, about 67 % of voters agreed with Koizumi’s second trip to the North 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2004), and Koizumi succeeded in boosting the approval rate of his 
Cabinet. This surprise visit to Pyongyang increased the approval rate around 10 %, so 
Koizumi achieved the mid-50 % level of support rate (Japan Times, 2004). 
 
 
3.5.3. Abduction issue 
 
There were growing calls and increasing the need for Japan to undertake another 
comprehensive talk with DPRK to solve the abduction issue. Abductees’ family members 
urged the Koizumi Cabinet to proceed further negotiation on returning the abduction 
victims to Japan. Koizumi appealed a principle for dealing with North Korea: the 
comprehensive resolution of nuclear weapons, missiles, and the abduction issue. Izumi 
evaluated the second trip to Pyongyang was a significant starting point of negotiation on 
the abduction issue and the comprehensive negotiation (Izumi, 2004, p.1). Comparing the 
first visit in 2002, Tokyo adopted a solid position towards Pyongyang at the second visit; 
without any further progress on the abduction issue, there would be no negotiation on any 
other matters and such an attitude was what made the whole negotiation possible. 
 
Although after his second visit, Pyongyang sent the families of the abductees who returned 
to Japan in 2002 and the remains of the abductees declared dead by North Korea, the 
domestic public opinion in Japan towards Pyongyang became increasingly critical. 
Koizumi’s second visit resulted in bringing back the family members of abductees who 
	 	 83	
repatriated to Japan in 2002 except Hitomi Soga’s family due to the worrisome of being 
court-martialed for desertion of her husband, Charles Jenkins27. Kim suggested Koizumi 
arrange Soga family’s reunion in Beijing. However, Soga refused the idea because Beijing 
is a forced place by Kim and she thought the place is closely linked to North Korea. Finally, 
Soga family reunited in Jakarta, Indonesia where there is no extradition treaty with the 
United States. After that Jenkins went through a trial for his defection to North Korea, but 
he could eventually settle down in Japan with his family. 
 
 
3.5.4. The Bureaucrats-Politicians Interaction 
 
3.5.4.1. At the Pre-negotiation Phases 
 
Since 2003, some signs of movement in the bilateral relationship between Japan and DPRK 
appeared. In December 2003, an LDP legislator Katsuei Hirasawa Jin Matsubara from the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) met Jong Thae Hwa, North Korea’s ambassador for 
negotiation with Japan. The meeting held in Beijing implied a new movement of North 
Korean28. At the discussion table, Jong offered that North Korea would release the family 
members of 5 abductees who returned to Japan in 2002, under the condition of them 
coming to Japan to pick them up (Funabashi, 2008, p.43). The North insisted that the return 
of 5 abductees be “temporary visiting,” but Japanese government did not return them. In 
																																																								
27 Charles Jenkins, Soga’s husband and a former United States Army sergeant who allegedly deserted his Army unit and 
defected to North Korea, refused to go to Japan for the fear that he may be court-martialed for desertion under an 
extradition treaty between the United States and Japan. Although Jenkins deserted in 1965 across the Demilitarized Zone 
(DMZ), the wartime desertion is punishable by long confinement or the death sentence (Curtin, 2004). 
28 The North side demanded the meeting first and requested two Diet members, Hirasawa and Matsubara. 
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the informal meeting, North Korea delivered the message via Hirasawa and Matsubara to 
send those five abductees back, then the possibility of returning their family members along 
with them was also in the consideration. However, those Japanese politicians rejected such 
proposal based on the judgment that it was highly possible for North Korea not to return 
those abductees to Japan if they would go to Pyongyang as the North suggested, so the 
meeting in Beijing resulted in confirming each parties’ different opinions. 
 
The Japanese government dispatched Hitoshi Tanaka, the Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Mitoji Yabunaka, the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Director-General to 
Pyongyang on February 11, 2004, to discuss with North Korea about the resolution of the 
abduction issue. Tanaka was successful to organize the Koizumi-Kim Summit Meeting in 
2002 deploying his personal connection with the high-ranking North Korean officer, 
namely Mr. X. When the abductees returned to Japan, he claimed to send them back to 
Pyongyang as Japan promised. His stance was severely criticized by the public and his 
status at North Korean diplomacy unstable after the meeting. Notwithstanding his 
hardship29, Shinzo Abe achieved political success with his hardline stance towards the 
DPRK. The LDP politicians recommended Yabunaka to accompany with Tanaka 
considering his hardline stance towards the North. Nomination of Yabunaka reflected the 
LDP’s firm stance that the party had the will to initiate hardline North Korea policies. With 
using the close relationship with a North Korean official known as Mr.X, Tanaka managed 
to meet Kang Sok Ju, North Korea’s first deputy foreign minister in Pyongyang. However, 
the meeting could not produce any significant result. Two days earlier the meeting, Japan 
amended Japan’s Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law enabling Japan to 																																																								
29 On July 11th 2003, a time bomb was set in the garage of his house by rightists (Tanaka, 2009, p. 139).  
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impose sanctions on North Korea on its own with being independent on the UNSC. Kang 
denounced the amendment and also Japan as it broke the promise first. Yabunaka required 
Jong to release the family members of returned abductees, but Kang insisted that Japan 
should return them first as Jong did when he met Hirasawa and Matsubara. 
 
In April 2004, Hirasawa went to Dalian in order to meet Song Il Ho, the North Korean 
deputy director of foreign ministry. Taku Yamasaki30, the former Deputy President of the 
LDP, also known as a close friend of Koizumi, accompanied with Hirasawa to the trip. In 
Hirasawa’s book, he said that North Korea preferred negotiating on the abduction issue 
with Japanese legislators to MOFA bureaucrats because MOFA was not trustworthy to 
North Korea (Hirasawa, 2004, p.38). In addition, Yamasaki’s presence at the talk enhanced 
its importance as he was one who can “talk to Prime Minister” (p. 89). He stated it was 
impossible for Japan to allow the abductees to go back to North Korea to take their families 
and the negotiation could be made officially with MOFA diplomats (Yonhap News, 2004). 
However, when their visit to was revealed, the Japanese government reacted vigorously due 
to thier violation of the Japanese government’s principle of unifying the window of 
negotiation with North Korea under MOFA. After returning to Tokyo, Hirasawa had to step 
down from his posts with being in responsible of dualistic diplomacy without the 
government’s pre-permission31. 
 																																																								
30 Yamasaki lost at the Lower House election in 2003. North Korea pointed him to engage in the pre-negotiation in Dalian 
with Hirasawa. Perhaps, North Korea targeted him as he was seeking to make an impressive political debut and he was in 
the position of giving advice to Koizumi then. Yamasaki’s suggestion to normalize their diplomatic relations before 
finishing Koizumi’s term of office somehow pressed North Korean officials.	
31 After the solo diplomacy of Hirasawa, he was forced to step down from the posts of vice minister of internal affairs and 
communications and secretary general of Rachi Giren (Hagström, 2015, p. 78). The punishment put on him was 
resigning form posts he held, and it was not so heavy. He was not expelled from the LDP or he had to step down from his 
post as a Diet member.	
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However, going to Dalian was not Hirasawa’s sole decision. He explained the goal and 
contents of the journey to Dalian to whom “must know” about it (Hirasawa, 2004, p. 100).  
Even he mentioned it is not exposable whether he reported to Koizumi before or not (p. 89), 
it is still be a question that who else can be the one to report if he consult with the person 
who “must know” about him going to Dalian. 
 
Again in May 2004, Tanaka flew to Beijing and had a meeting with Jong. During the 
meeting, North Korean side confirmed that they were willing to return the family members 
of 5 abductees although they did not make clear about Hitomi Soga’s family (Funabashi, 
2008, p. 48). In this meeting, Jong suggested Koizumi’s second visit to Pyongyang and 
Tanaka immediately accepted the proposal based on Koizumi’s pre-permission. This 
meeting in Beijing made significant progress for Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in 2004. 
 
Thus, the four pre-negotiations for Koizumi’s second visit to Pyongyang indicate 
politicians-bureaucrats’ cooperative attitudes towards the Kantei’s policy initiatives. 
Politicians with close relationship with Koizumi and bureaucrats who need authority to 
support their actions went to the pre-negotiation sessions. Such a series of dispatching 
politicians and bureaucrats implies that the second visit was a top-down decision making. 
 
 
3.5.4.2. The Politicized Abduction Issue 
 
Both politicians and bureaucrats made Koizumi’s second visit to Pyongyang in 2004. North 
Korea approached Hirasawa, a politician with significant interests in the abduction issue, to 
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break through the negotiation on normalization due to the abduction issue. He can certainly 
be classified as Rachizoku (abduction policy tribe). He had close ties with the abduction 
victims’ families and voiced that the collapse of the Kim regime is the only way to solve 
the abduction issue completely32. Shinzo Abe was benefited from the abduction issue. He 
accompanied Koizumi to Pyongyang in 2002. After 2002 summit meeting between Japan 
and the DPRK, Koizumi changed his North Korea policy from Tanaka’s dialogue line to 
Abe’s hard line adopting Kazokukai and the Japanese public’s policy preference (Asahi 
Shimbun, November 8, 2002). While confronting with Hitoshi Tanaka, he successfully 
changed the policy direction. His adherence to hardline policy towards North Korea, in 
particular on the abduction issue, contributed him to be a prominent political figure in 
Japan. In this sense, considering his post in the Cabinet at that time, he could be classified 
as a Master type of Rachizoku. 
 
Hasuike (2015) proclaims that there are politicians who use the abduction issue politically 
regarding neither their parties nor factions, and this is what makes the abduction issue not 
go forward (p. 85). Yoriko Koike, and LDP politician, held charity concerts for the 
abductees’ families in order to help them financially, but the money went to a certain 
person in Kazokukai or the Investigation Commission on Missing Japanese Probably 
Related to North Korea, a private citizens’ group (p. 209-210). Kyoko Nakayama became a 
Special Advisor to the Prime Minister for the North Korean abduction issue in 2002. She 
started gaining popularity among the public throughout her career as an adviser giving 
impression that she was deeply involved in the abduction issue as she went to Pyongyang to 																																																								
32 In his book, he suggested four methods to solve issues with North Korea including the abduction issue; 1) the use of 
armed force, 2) collapsing the Kim regime, 3) imposing economic sanction as a pressuring measure, and 4) keeping only 
negotiations without any further action (p. 131- 133). 
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pick up five abductees. She ran an election as an LDP’s proportional representation 
candidate and got elected at the Upper House election in 2007. Shingo Nishimura is also 
one of those politicians. He criticized Japan’s food aid and bilateral talks with North Korea 
that those dovish efforts do not result in any progress on the abduction issue. 
 
In some aspects, they can be classified as Rachizoku. However, considering the lack of 
General type of Rachizoku, their advocacy effort is not solving the abduction issue 
genuinely, rather for raising political funds, election campaign and exposing their names on 
mass media. Moreover, those politicians are known as hawkish politicians who advocate 
the constitutional amend to make japan enable to posses military power. The mobbish 
Rachizoku link the abduction issue to their proclaim of “normal state”. 
 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
Aberbach et al. proposed four “images” of the possible division of labor in the policy-
making or decision-making process between politicians and bureaucrats. Image I illustrates 
the simplistic view that politicians make policies and bureaucrats implement them. Image II 
explains their notable roles; politicians represent interests of their constituencies, and 
bureaucrats use neutral expertise in policymaking. Image III indicates that politicians’ 
partisan, ideological and passionate nature and bureaucrats’ prudent, practical and 
pragmatic nature are taken into consideration of policymaking. Image IV addresses the 
blurred distinction of politicians and bureaucrats, and this model is called as the pure hybrid 
model. About the domestic and international factional interaction regarding diplomatic 
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decision-making, Waltz claims that domestic political factors influence a country’s external 
behavior (Second Image Theory). On the other hand, Gourevitch insists that a country’s 
foreign policy is a result of a domestic political struggle. 
 
By using a model of domestic-international linkage and a model of domestic interaction 
between elected representatives and career bureaucrats, this section aims at analyzing 
Kanemaru and Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in 1990, 2002 and 2004. 
 
Based on the analysis above, Kanemaru’s visit to Pyongyang in 1990 can be explained as 
Aberbach et al.’s Image IV. As the roles and strategies of MOFA and Kanemaru over the 
Declaration are blurred, the interaction between bureaucrats and politicians are likely the 
same. Kanemaru, who had support foundation at the agricultural tribe and the construction 
tribe, needed those Zokugiins’ support in order to make a political breakthrough for the 
domestic issues such as Recruit Scandal and the introduction of the consumption tax. The 
end of the Cold War, an epoch-making event, was a big motivation for MOFA to seek a 
way to open a relationship with North Korea in order to react South Korea’s diversification 
of diplomatic channels. In short, for both Kanemaru and MOFA, the Pyongyang trip was a 
card to make a penetration domestically and internationally. A politician understood the 
bureaucracy comprehended a politician’s domestic political interests. 
 
In this case, Second Image Reversed can be applied because the big transition, the end of 
Cold War was a decisive factor for Kanemaru’s visit. If there was no South Korea’s 
Nordpolitik to ease tension and a new power alignment, MOFA could not move to have a 
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dialogue with North Korea. MOFA planned the summit meeting in order to react to South 
Korea’s diversification of diplomatic channel. 
 
As Koizumi initiated the meeting and MOFA’s career diplomats tuned the pre-negotiations 
that prepared for the Summit Meeting in Pyongyang, it can be said that Aberbach et al.’s 
Image III fits this case before the Bush Administration changed its North Korea policy. 
Both Koizumi and MOFA engaged in policymaking with concerning with politics. Seeking 
a domestic political breakthrough motivated Koizumi to engage with Pyongyang, whereas 
MOFA (the Asian Bureau led by Hitoshi Tanaka) pursued independent diplomacy from the 
United States whose policy had neglected North Korea’s nuclear development. In addition, 
South Korea’s sunshine policy made it easier for Japan to approach North Korea. In this 
case, Gourevitch’s Second Image Reversed fits this case, as the international factors 
allowed Tokyo’s policymakers to pursue a soft approach to Pyongyang. 
 
However, after George W Bush’s “Axis of Evil” statement, the international situation got 
favorable to pursuing hardline policy. The North American Bureau could have raised its 
voice to not to go to Pyongyang and put pressure on it. Despite this, Koizumi pushed ahead 
with the plan of having a summit meeting with Kim. Rather than obeying the bureaucracy, 
he pressed forward with the trip in order to make a political breakthrough. Accordingly, 
MOFA and Koizumi changed their interest, so Koizumi went to Pyongyang to have a 
summit meeting with Kim, in order to resolve abduction issue by returning five abductees 
back to Japan. The international situation narrowed down their policy choice to focus on 
the abduction issue rather than pursuing other issues such as normalization or resolving 
nuclear or missile issues. This changing interest shows that after Bush’s policy change, 
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MOFA and Koizumi had consensus on the focused issue with North Korean, which is the 
abduction issue. Therefore, Second Image Reversed and Image IV fit into this case 
simultaneously.  
 
Aberbach et al.’s Image II fits best in Koizumi’s second trip case, as the Kantei took the 
leadership in North Korea policymaking including the abduction issue after the first visit. 
Again, Koizumi wanted to make a political breakthrough in the coming Upper House 
election facing trouble with the public pension scandal. Koizumi emphasized his 
responsiveness to relevant interests of the Japanese public on the abduction issue. After the 
2002 meeting, a Master type of Rachizoku, Abe successfully influenced the Kantei’s 
decision to change its policy direction from “dialogue” to “pressure”. Kazokukai strongly 
urged the Government of Japan to save the families of returned abductees. Mobbish 
Rachizoku raised the issue as well in order to get popularity. A Soldier type of Rachizoku, 
Hirasawa, went to negotiations instead of MOFA bureaucrats with the mission of 
negotiating with the North on bringing abductees’ families to Japan. When Hirasawa 
managed to raise politically sensitive suggestions, Koizumi dispatched Tanaka to direct the 
negotiations with his experienced skill dealing with North Korea. Same as the first trip, the 
second trip resulted in bringing only the families of returned abductees and setting Soga 
family’s reunion in Jakarta, without jeopardizing the SPT and Washington’s general North 
Korea policy. Second Image Theory explains the case, as domestic political interests were 
more convincing for Koizumi to go to Pyongyang.  
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Chapter 4. Conclusion 
 
 
4.1. Research Findings and Analysis 
 
This thesis has examined Japanese foreign policymaking and the involved actors with their 
distinctive roles in the lens of Elitist/Pluralist models. The case study chapter analyzed Shin 
Kanemaru and Junichiro Koizumi with a focus on their Summit meetings in Pyongyang 
with Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in 1990, 2002 and 2004, using Aberbach et al.’s 
framework of four Images of domestic policy making, Waltz’s Second Image and 
Gourevitch’s Second Image Reversed. This conclusion part now brings together 
discussions and the research findings of how politicians and bureaucrats interact regarding 
policymaking on the abduction issue and the influence of domestic and international factors 
affecting the decision-making. With four criteria of actors, interests, interactions, and 
outcomes, the author determines the best fit of politician-bureaucrat interaction model for 
each case and the direction of international/domestic political influence.  
 
4.1.1. Kanemaru’s case in 1990 
 
In Kanemaru’s case, Kanemaru and MOFA are deeply involved. These two key players had 
different interests, but they mutually understood each other’s interests. Such mutual 
understanding was likely when they worked closely. After a defeat at the Upper House 
election in 1989, the LDP had to seek a way to get power and support from the public back 
(Murayama, personal communication, December 7, 2016). Kanemaru was a General Type 
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of Zokugiin, who had to concern further national interest than factional or tribal interests. 
His supporters from the construction tribe and agricultural tribe expected possible business 
opportunities with North Korea after diplomatic normalization. He attempted to make a 
domestic political breakthrough based on cooperation from the construction tribe and 
agricultural tribe, who were interested in the possible business opportunities. MOFA 
wanted to open a dialogue with North Korea in order to react to South Korea’s 
diversification of diplomatic channels through Nordpolitik at the end of Cold War era. In 
other words, bureaucrats in MOFA who worried about Japan’s isolation in Northeast Asia 
initiated the meeting. 
     
Both Kanemaru and MOFA did not have any intention to achieve diplomatic normalization 
with North Korea. Based on Tanabe’s interview with Asahi Shimbun and Murayama’s 
interview with the author, Kanemaru’s interest for the summit meeting was not normalizing 
the relationship with North Korea, but making a domestic political breakthrough. MOFA 
did not expect a sudden normalization either, rather preferred opening a dialogue in order to 
deal with other related issues such as nuclear weapons, missile launches and the abduction 
issue of Japanese people. According to MOFA’s policy principle of aligning security policy 
with the United States and not jeopardizing the relationship with the ROK, MOFA rejected 
implementing the Three Party Declaration and defined Kanemaru’s trip as “unofficial”.  
     
Even though the international factor was favorable for Japan to pursue diplomatic 
normalization with North Korea, Japan did not normalize its relations. In order to normalize, 
Japan had to negotiate several issues: rescuing two fishermen of the Fujisanmaru 18, 
compensation for its colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula, suspicion of Pyongyang’s 
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nuclear development, and its abducted citizens. For MOFA, without touching more 
sensitive issues, taking those detained fishermen back was probably the best option to make. 
For Kanemaru, saving them could offer an opportunity for a domestic political 
breakthrough. Certainly, he understood the bureaucracy’s logic of a big power game in the 
international political arena, and the bureaucracy understood the politician’s domestic 
interests. This mutual comprehension between politics and bureaucracy fits into Image IV.  
 
Gourevitch’s Second Image Reversed theory would expect that the end of Cold War as an 
international factor strongly impacted on Kanemaru’s visit to Pyongyang. Seoul’s 
Nordpolitik and the collapse of the Soviet Union would have urged Tokyo’s policymakers 
who worried about the diplomatic isolation to pursue an improving relationship with 
Pyongyang. On the other hand, Waltz’s theory would anticipate that the domestic hardships 
such as the LDP’s decline in popularity due to the bribery scandal and introduction of 
consumption tax have the influence on Kanemaru’s visit. Although the domestic political 
hardship influenced Kanemaru’s decision to go to Pyongyang, a mere suggestion of 
normalization with North Korea would not have been possible without the power 
realignment at the end of Cold War. Domestic factors cannot be underestimated, but the 
fundamental reason of the preparation of Kanemaru’s visit was more for reacting to the 
new international order of the end of Cold War.  
 
Kanemaru’s visit was motivated by two factors: first, resolving the Fujisanmaru issue and 
second, Seoul’s active diplomacy towards the USSR and China. However, according to 
Murayama (2016), without South Korea’s Nordpolitik and 7.7 Declaration, it might be 
more difficult for Japanese policymakers to approach North Korea due to the fears of 
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jeopardizing the bilateral relations with South Korea and consequentially isolating itself in 
the region (Murayama, personal communication, December 7, 2016). While Japan already 
had established its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1956 and China in 1972 
(Hook, 2005, p. 166; T. Tanaka, 2013, p. 260), considering the Cold War period and the 
United States as an ally, the relationships with the two socialist states could not be so 
friendly. Moreover, considering North Korea as a party without diplomatic relations in the 
region, the end of the Cold War and Seoul’s approach to Moscow and Beijing alarmed 
Tokyo that it needed to diversify its diplomatic channels. 
 
 
4.1.2. Koizumi’s case in 2002 
 
 Koizumi’s trip can be analyzed in two phases. The first phase is before the United States 
changed its policy towards the DPRK (before the “Axis of Evil” statement). Koizumi’s 
journey was planned by a MOFA bureaucrat, Hitoshi Tanaka, then General Director of the 
Asia Bureau. MOFA had a bigger plan to talk to North Korea regarding its nuclear and 
missile development. However, due to the Clinton administration’s strategic neglect, 
MOFA felt a sense of frustration. Such circumstance made Hitoshi Tanaka to pursue 
diplomacy more independently from the United States. Also, Prime Minister Koizumi 
certainly supported the plan for the summit meeting with North Korea.  
 
MOFA Bureaucrats were competing between the North American Bureau and the Asian 
Bureau in order to promote each bureau’s policy direction towards North Korea. The North 
American Bureau’s policy direction was the hawkish one as U.S. President Bush made the 
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“Axis of Evil” statement. On the other hand, the Asian Bureau promoted independent 
diplomacy from the United States. Traditionally, the North American Bureau held the lead 
regarding policy direction. However, under Prime Minister and Foreign Minister’s support, 
the Asian Bureau’s independent diplomacy line was adapted as a keynote for North Korea 
diplomacy. Also, the bureau’s soft approach was possible as the inter-Korean relations 
were reconciling due to the sunshine policy of South Korea. South Korea’s independent 
engagement with North Korea urged Japan to pursue independent diplomacy. 
 
 
Table 2. Timeline of Koizumi’s first visit  	
 
Aberbach et al.’s Image III best fits this case, as both politicians and MOFA bureaucrats 
were concerned with their own politics; politicians (Koizumi and Makiko Tanaka) 
concerned with gaining public support and his or her own ideological interests, and the 
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bureaucrats with internal competition within the bureaucracy and the opportunity to 
approach Pyongyang in the era of reconciliation between two Koreas. As Hitoshi Tanaka 
evaluates that Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy was what made the planning of Koizumi’s 
visit possible, the international factor mattered a lot. Therefore, Gourevitch’s Second Image 
Reversed provides a better analysis base as the idea of the meeting was passed to Tanaka 
from his predecessor who valued independent diplomacy based on the détente mood in the 
Korean Peninsula. The number of participants who concerned is also limited within Prime 
Minister, politicians (especially Makiko Tanaka) and MOFA.  Although there was the Mob 
type of Rachizoku, they were excluded from accessing information leading to the decision 
to visit Pyongyang. 
 
On the other hand, after Bush made the famous “Axis of Evil” statement (second phase), 
the international situation got more favorable to Japan for pursuing a hawkish policy line. 
Traditionally, the North American Bureau was in a better position of influencing the 
direction of diplomacy. Moreover, Washington’s policy shift was a chance for the bureau to 
raise its voice to push ahead with a hardline policy towards Pyongyang. Nevertheless, the 
domestic political situation such as reshuffling the popular Foreign Minister Makiko 
Tanaka could motivate Koizumi to pursue a diplomatic success, the escalating missile and 
nuclear concerns ruled out immediate normalization.  
 
Furthermore, considering the Asian Bureau’s subservient status to the North American 
Bureau, Hitoshi Tanaka’s active engagement in pre-negotiation was possible under the 
Prime Minister’s support. Hitoshi Tanaka started negotiating with the North Korean 
counterparts since fall 2001 in order to bring the abductees back to Japan. In order to make 
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a more visible progress, he propelled Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang (Tanaka, 2009, p. 104-
110). If Koizumi adopted the North American Bureau’s policy direction, the summit 
meeting with Kim would have been less likely.  
 
The meeting resulted in neither any significant progress on the nuclear issue nor positive 
effect on Washington’s North Korea policy because the main purpose of the meeting for 
Koizumi was “resolving” the abduction issue. In order to facilitate a smooth progress on the 
abduction issue, these delicate issues were merely touched  (Nishioka, 2006). Both parties 
confirmed that North Korea would comply with the international agreement regarding the 
nuclear development (p. 49). Still, Japan ought to coordinate its security policy with the 
United States. Both Koizumi and Tanaka had to focus on the abduction issue, without 
jeopardizing the bilateral framework with Washington.  
 
Although international factors favored Japan to pursue a hard-line policy towards the North, 
Koizumi visited Pyongyang to get five abductees back to Japan. When MOFA planned the 
summit meeting with Kim, its objective was to build a friendly relationship with North 
Korea after resolving the abduction issue. However, Koizumi and other politicians, 
especially then CCS Shinzo Abe, drove the focus of Koizumi’s visit more towards the 
abduction issue more than the nuclear or missile concerns. As mass media dragged the 
public’s attention to the abduction issue, it escalated a highly politically sensitive matter. 
Indeed, after Bush’s announcement of the policy shift vis-à-vis Pyongyang, MOFA’s role 
in the policy-making over the abduction issue shrank.  
As a result, the meeting resulted in neither any significant progress on the nuclear issue nor 
positive effect on Washington’s North Korea policy. In order to expect the smooth progress 
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on the abduction issue, those delicate issues were merely touched. Still, Japan ought to 
direct its security policy with the United States. Both Koizumi and Tanaka had to focus on 
the abduction issue without imperiling the bilateral framework with Washington. At this 
point, Tanaka understood Koizumi’s political need for the meeting with Kim, and Koizumi 
decided to keep supporting Tanaka’s policy line. Their mutual understanding represents 
Image IV, where politicians and bureaucrats blurred their roles and find consensus interests. 
 
Gourevitch’s Second Image explains well on the Elitist approach as MOFA and Kantei 
were major players in the decision making process. Since politicians allied with interest 
groups and mass media appeared at this time, this case seems a Pluralist approach. 
However, considering that these Rachizoku were Mobs, not Masters (even Soldiers), it is 
difficult to say that their influence was significant on policy-making.  Still, this case shows 
a top-down policy making process as Mobs, media and the interest groups did not have 
noteworthy influence over it. Abe and Hitoshi Tanaka’s confrontation over returning five 
abductees back resulted in Abe’s victory, meaning the political interest prevailed over the 
bureaucratic (the Asian Bureau) rationality. Then Koizumi shifted the policy later as James 
Kelly, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs confirmed 
the existence of Highly Enriched Uranium in North Korea during his visit on October 17, 
2002, and not to return those abductees to North Korea (Nishioka, 2006, p. 49). 
 
According to the Second Image Reversed, Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang was not a product 
of domestic politics prevailing over the Bush administration’s hawkish approach. Thus, 
Second Image cannot be applied here, as the trip was more international politics as a factor, 
rather than domestic political issue-oriented one. 
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4.1.3. Koizumi’s case in 2004 
 
At the pre-negotiation stage, Koizumi’s second visit to Pyongyang in 2004 showed a 
typical top-down decision-making process. Like in Image II, different politicians brought 
various political interests for themselves and the bureaucracy took its cumulative 
knowledge and diplomatic negotiation skill.  
     
In setting up the meeting, this tendency of Image II is clear. Koizumi wanted to use the 
abduction issue to keep his popularity. Some politicians started advocating the abduction 
issue, and so-called Rachizoku appeared after the 2002 summit meeting. Shinzo Abe 
(Master type), then Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, who constantly had interests in the 
abduction issue, initiated changes in North Korea policy. Many other politicians such as 
Yuriko Koike, Kyouko Nakayama, and Shingo Nishimura (Mob type) raised their voice as 
well, in order to gain the public’s attention. In 2003, North Korea approached Hirasawa 
(Soldier type) proposing an informal meeting. Differing from bureaucrats who adhere to 
command system, politicians do not strictly abide by an organizational framework. This is 
how Hirasawa (and Kanemaru as well) was able to meet the North Korean side (Murayama, 
personal communication, December 7, 2016).  
 
In reply to North Korea’s suggestion to Hirasawa that the five abductees who returned to 
Japan in 2002 come to Pyongyang to pick up their families, Koizumi dispatched MOFA’s 
bureaucrat, Tanaka who rejected the proposal at the meeting in February 2004. After two 
months, when Hirasawa met North Korean counterparts again, North Koreans suggested 
diplomatic normalization and sending the families to Japan. In May 2004, Tanaka tuned 
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those propositions of family reunions to be implemented, so Koizumi’s second trip to 
Pyongyang and sending of the families of the five abductees to Japan were finalized. This 
case fits into Image II, in which Koizumi was interested in bringing the families of the 
abductees to Japan, whereas MOFA was detailing the plan according to the Kantei’s policy 
initiatives without its own political interest. From 2002, due to the continuous missile 
launches and nuclear development by North Korea, the Asian Bureau lost reasons to pursue 
normalization with North Korea. Politicians brought domestic political interests and 
bureaucrats utilized their expertise in order to set up the meeting with Kim. 
 
Along with the first visit in 2002, Koizumi’s second visit to Pyongyang in 2004 was 
influenced more by domestic factors than international factors (Second Image). Domestic 
political hardship such as enclosing the non-payment of pension to the public before the 
Upper House election motivated Koizumi to break through domestic hardships with gains 
in diplomacy. Also, the politicization of the abduction issue after 2002 was another factor. 
Some mobbish Rachizoku (abduction tribe) fanned the heat over the abduction issue 
without proposing any genuine solution, and Kazokukai demanded a visible solution for the 
issue. In contrast, Koizumi’s second trip did not result in any progress in nuclear or missile 
issues. He succeeded to bring the families to Japan, but the summit meeting with Kim 
affected neither North Korea’s nuclear pursuit nor its participation in the SPT. Without 
Pyongyang’s positive policy change, Koizumi only accomplished a limited diplomatic 
success on the abduction issue, which he could domestically appeal as his political 
achievement.  
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4.2. Lessons of Dealing with the Abduction Issue 
  
By comparing the two politicians’ cases, it is possible to postulate that the Kantei (or a 
powerful politician in Kanemaru’s case) takes a leading role. The balance between 
MOFA’s grand strategy in diplomacy and the Kantei’s political interest is what leads the 
direction of Japan’s diplomacy. They depend on each other; MOFA needs supports from 
the ruling party and especially Prime Minister. Politicians need MOFA’s ability of 
information gathering, strategic analysis, and negotiation technics in order to accomplish 
their diplomatic success.  
 
Bureaucracy is a group representing rationality in policymaking. If Japan’s diplomacy were 
led by bureaucratic rationality, based on international political dynamics, the focus of the 
abduction issue would be so much different from how it has been so far. It is possible to 
anticipate that at least the abduction issue might be dealt with less significantly than those 
visible security threats. Reacting to the international environment surrounding Pyongyang, 
Koizumi would not have had the summit meeting with Kim, and the abduction issue might 
still remain as a secondary topic within the SPT or the US-Japan alliance framework. The 
abduction issue seems to have taken a central role in Japan’s diplomacy. However, in fact, 
this issue is more domestically oriented. The case studies here prove that the bureaucracy is 
not always rational as demonstrated by its internal politics among different divisions and 
policy orientations. The abduction issue had a more domestic ground to appeal to the public. 
Kanemaru’s Pyongyang visit in 1990 and Koizumi’s visit in 2002 fit into Image III and IV. 
These Images representing Elitist model shows that the abduction issue relating few 
political leaders excluding other participants in decision-making and bureaucrats and 
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politicians coincide the policy outcomes based on their interests. When the international 
situation is changing rapidly, the Elitist can react to those changes better than the approach. 
To this extent, the Elitist model is closely linked to situations when international political 
factors have a dominant impact on the policy making process as Gourevitch’s Second 
Image Reversed Theory explains. Although Koizumi’s second visit seems that there are 
many actors involved, the case is a typical elitist model. Koizumi initiated the trip for a 
political breakthrough, and a Rachizoku politician, Hirasawa conducted a mission to 
arrange a meeting. Then a MOFA diplomat tuned miscellaneous parts of the summit 
meeting in order to make abductees’ family members come to Japan.  
 
Under the Abe cabinet, the abduction issue is not a topic for the Japanese domestic politics 
anymore (Murayama, personal communication, December 7, 2016). Since there are no 
more interest-oriented motivations in his perspective, he has no plan to meet Kim Jong Un 
in person to discuss the resolution of the abduction issue. Losing the domestic interest of 
the issue resulted in disappearing Soldier or Mob type of Rachizoku. An anonymous 
politician said in the interview that there is no politician, who work for Abe to bridge with 
North Korea these days as he does not have a strong will to hold a summit meeting with 
Kim.  
 
Although secondaryPrime Minister Shinzo Abe’s political stance towards the abduction 
issue has a distinctive position from those two former political leaders, Japan’s leading 
diplomatic principles dealing with North Korea have not been changed: comprehensive 
resolution of nuclear, missile, and abduction issues within the solidarity of the United 
States, Japan, and South Korea. After a series of nuclear tests and missile launches by 
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North Korea, Abe’s approach to the issue is to pursue Japan as a “normal state” and push 
North Korea more harshly. 
 
 
4.3. Further Research 
 
Finally, it is useful to consider the limitation of this research and suggestions for further 
studies. Firstly, as some politicians rejected interviews, it is hard to get precise evidence for 
Rachizoku’s policy orientations. Secondly, lack of information about Kanemaru’s reported 
promise to compensate North Korea for the 45 years of suffering after the WWII brought 
difficulties analyzing Kanemaru-MOFA interaction, so dependency on secondary sources 
was unavoidable. Thirdly, this thesis only concentrates on analyzing only major summit 
meetings between major Japanese political figures and North Korean leaders. Other 
decisions related to the abduction issue such as the Stockholm Agreement in 2014 and 
other working-group talks were not discussed here. The abduction issue is highly 
politicized in Japanese domestic politics, and Japanese people accept the resolution of the 
issue as a state’s role and identity (H.Y. Kim, 2014).  The approach towards North Korea is 
purely the subject of domestic politicization in Japan. Major politicians, Kanemaru and 
Koizumi, were negotiation representatives of the case studies in this thesis. On the other 
hand, the Stockholm Agreement and other low-level talks were mainly led by MOFA 
bureaucrats33. Also, Koizumi’s two visits actually produced the visible results of returning 
abductees and their family members to Japan contrasting Kanemaru’s visit in 1990, in 
																																																								33	Junichi Ihara, the director of the Asian Bureau, was the negotiation leader of the Stockholm Agreement in 2014.	
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which the abduction issue was not a topic of the meeting even the issue already been 
reported to the Diet by that time. 
 
The abduction issue of Japanese people by North Korea was escalated highly politically 
after Koizumi’s first visit to Pyongyang in 2002. Some politicians started advocating the 
abduction issue to get attention and popularity. Their role was not so influential that they 
could not actually alert the policy direction. When the abduction issue is not highly 
politicized, they are invisible, and when the issue rises as a hot political topic, their voice 
becomes louder but without affecting any realistic influence on policies. 	
 
 
Words: 26,680 (Including Abstract) 
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Appendices 			
Interview questions with former Prime Minister of Japan Tomoiichi Murayama 		
(1) It is about the Three Party Declaration. The Declaration’s content is beyond that of 
the treaty between Japan and South Korea in 1965. Of course, the Government of 
Japan did not recognize it. Do you think he Kanemaru, such a prominent politician 
failed to expect this result? 
(2) Is there any reason behind that Kanemaru promised Kim Il Sung to compensate for 
the 45 years of loss of North Koreans after the WWII? 
(3) About Kanemaru’s visit to Pyongyang in 1990, how were the stances of d the LDP 
and the JSP different? 
(4) Do you see any problematic aspects of the politicization of Kazokukai? 
(5) Hirasawa said in his book that North Korea approached Japanese politicians instead 
of MOFA because MOFA was not trustworthy. Why did they think so? Please, 
share your opinion on how he contributed to Koizumi’s second trip to Pyongyang in 
2004. 
(6) Concerning policymaking in the abduction issue, what are the roles of politicians 
and MOFA bureaucrats? 
(7) Could you share your opinions on the Abe cabinet’s North Korean policy including 
the abduction issue?  
(8) Where is the abduction issue’s status in the overall Japan’s North Korea policy? 
	 	 119	
(9) How is the comprehensive resolution of nuclear weapons, missile developments and 
the abduction issue connected to Japan’s foreign policy? 
 
The interview was conducted in Japanese language and these questions are translated into 
English by the author.  
